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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THOMAS MOREY LUDDEN. The impact of mortgage foreclosure on housing prices 
and homeownership in Charlotte, North Carolina. (Under the direction DR. OWEN 
FURUSETH) 
 
 
At the end of the last century, the U.S. housing market was volatile. The average 
price of housing increased by 50 percent, while the national rate of loans entering 
foreclosure was 0.3 percent. Across the nation, local housing markets displayed uneven 
gains in housing prices as foreclosure impacted neighborhoods differently.  The scope 
and varying contexts surrounding foreclosure activity between 2003 and 2007 present an 
opportunity to expand the core knowledge of housing studies. What is largely absent 
from the current housing analysis is the geographical impact of the contemporary 
mortgage distress on housing prices and ownership.  This research examines the impact 
of foreclosure on housing prices and homeownership at the neighborhood level analyzing 
concentration, proximity and length of foreclosure while controlling for the temporal, 
neighborhood and housing characteristics. The empirical analysis of the issue used local 
data and contextual templates from Charlotte, North Carolina.  
The research findings indicate that proximity to and proportion of foreclosures in 
a neighborhood had the greatest negative impact on housing prices in neighborhoods with 
housing valued at less than $250,000.  The length of foreclosure was shown to have a 
negative impact on housing prices in the lowest valued housing neighborhoods.  The 
length of foreclosure also negatively impacted home ownership rates.  Other findings 
revealed that structural, neighborhood, and distance variables influenced home ownership 
rates.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For many American households, buying and maintaining a home is part of the 
American dream. Besides the intangible aspects of homeownership such as security and 
building a place for family, homeownership has traditionally provided the opportunity for 
households to build wealth. Real estate represents the largest asset for many American 
households. Indeed, with the increase in housing values in the past 10 years, many 
American households experienced a large jump in their overall wealth. On average, 
housing values increased almost 50 percent between 1998 and 2007 from $148,000 to 
$218,000 (Fernald 2008).  
At the end of the last century, owning your home became a reachable goal by 
more American households as incentives by government, non-profit organizations and 
financial institutions removed economic barriers to homeownership. The Department of 
Housing and Urban Development and state housing programs provided funding to assist 
would-be homebuyers earning low and moderate incomes with down payment assistance 
and closing costs (Galster, Aron and Reeder 1999). Non-profit, community assistance 
organizations provided opportunities for many low-income households to own a home 
through sweat equity in lieu of a larger down payment and low interest mortgages. 
However, the biggest increase can be attributed to the changing loan practices by 
financial institutions. With the restructuring of the mortgage markets, many low and 
middle-income households no longer had to rely on government programs or non-profits
 
 
 
 
 
 to own a home. Mortgage companies and real estate agents provided an easy avenue to 
home ownership through complex loan products that offset higher borrower risks with 
increased costs and delayed payment options. These products were commonly referred to 
as subprime mortgages. While the term is descriptive, increasingly it has come to 
represent a negative even sinister flaw in the home financing industry. 
Between 1993 and 2004, the rate of homeownership increased in the US from 63 
to 69 percent of all occupied housing units (US Census, 2007). This increase, translated 
into nearly 6.6 million new households living in owner-occupied housing. In large part, 
the jump in homeownership was linked to the combination of federal homeownership 
initiatives and innovative, but risky mortgage and financing schemes.  
During this same period, housing prices were accelerating at a rapid pace. 
Consider, that between 1975 and 2000 existing home sale prices grew one percent 
annually. Adjusted for inflation, sales prices moved from $124,000 to $148,000. But, 
between 2000 and 2006, the annual sales price of existing homes grew from $148,000 to 
$218,000 or an annual six percent increase adjusted for inflation (Fernald 2008). 
Beyond the individual economic benefits to home owners, higher rates of 
homeownership were valued by community leaders and local government leaders for the 
positive impacts on neighborhoods, including social-family, crime, and economic 
improvements. While rising housing values and homeownership have provided multiple 
benefits to lower and middle-income households and the communities in which they 
reside, the collapse of the subprime mortgage market during the past decade has erased 
much of the improvement (Barth et al. 2009). 
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Metropolitan Scale Difference in Housing Value Change 
Since 2001, housing values across the United States have varied widely. The 
change in housing prices has differed across different regions as well as metropolitan 
areas. In the Southeast, housing price increases have been fueled by the population 
growth experienced by the region over the past 30 years.  The Southwest also 
experienced similar growth pressures which have resulted in a boom in housing 
production.  
The housing industry has been especially robust in the metropolitan areas of the 
Sunbelt. However, the growth in housing in these metro areas also resulted in local real 
estate bubbles. With the increase in housing prices, investors within and outside metro 
areas invested heavily, spurring excessive demand that outpaced the supply of the local 
construction industry. Prices rose dramatically. But as phantom demand subsided, the 
overheated construction/real estate industry imploded. By the end of 2008, oversupply, a 
contracted credit market, and investor retreat led to sharp drops (“the bubble burst”) in 
Sunbelt housing markets. 
Table 1 presents a 20 city single-family housing price change metric (Case-Shiller 
Index) produced by Fiserv, a privately held financial services firm, and published by 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P). The tool is widely used in the financial industry for trend 
information in futures trading. The monthly generated index is based on repeat sales data 
of existing homes to show the year over year change in housing prices. The methodology 
for this index was developed by Karl Case and Bob Shiller in the 1980’s while 
researching the Boston housing market and is widely referred to by their names. The 
3
Table 1: Year over Year Housing Price Change, December 2010-2011 
 
Source: New York Times, SP/Case Shiller 
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information provides a useful tool to track housing price trends over time and offers a 
real time snapshot of local housing markets (Benner 2009).  
Between December 2010 and December 20111, the 20 city average experienced a 
slight 0.6 percent increase in housing values. Among the weakest metro markets, Chicago 
led the list with a 6 percent decline. In the top five, Charlotte has lost 4 percent over the 
past year along with Portland, Oregon and Tampa. Other metro areas in the top ten in 
housing price declines included Atlanta with a 3 percent decline. Although Charlotte and 
Atlanta did not experience an overinflated real estate market, they have been affected by 
the national downward trend in housing values. Their economies were linked to the 
service and financial sectors which have been high growth areas in the New South over 
the past 20 years. During the current economic recession and accompanying restructuring 
of the financial sector, however, they have experienced unprecedented economic 
challenges. 
 Two other metros with 3 percent declines were Las Vegas and Miami. They were 
the largest real estate markets in states that were frequently highlighted in the popular 
media as suffering the largest drops in housing, Nevada and Florida. Detroit was also a 
city in the top ten decline. In the case of this Michigan city, it has been particularly hard 
hit by the recession, shedding a large proportion of its manufacturing jobs, and 
depressing the local housing market. 
At the other end of the scale were cities where the housing market has continued 
to enjoy sustained values. The California housing markets such as San Francisco, San 
                                                 
1 The December 2010 S&P/Case Shiller index data was accessed from the nytimes.com website in 
February 2011 when this section was compiled and written. The data is released every month with a two 
month lag time for data collection.  
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Diego, and Los Angeles were appreciating. Although these areas have some of the 
highest priced housing markets in the nation, these markets were not subject to artificial 
demand as in some Sunbelt and Southwest cities. The Washington, D.C. metro area has 
also improved recently as single-family housing demand has begun to outpace supply 
(Theologis 2010).  
Denver and Dallas have also had housing price declines, but were not linked with 
large appreciating housing markets. The economies of these two cities were originally 
linked with the oil and gas economy and have recently diversified their economies and 
have managed to maintain viable housing markets. However, in the past both cities’ 
housing markets have been impacted by the volatility in the energy sector.  
 A longer trend in the housing market in the United States is illustrated in Figure 1.  
The figure displays year over year change in the housing prices beginning in 2001. The 
data distribution offers a dramatic portrayal of the collapse in housing values across the 
American housing market. For the first five years of the decade, housing prices climbed 
an average 10 percent annually. These increases were maintained until the beginning of 
2006. But, by the start of 2007, the price hikes changed to drops. The declines increased 
through 2008 and only began to level off in 2009.  The overall prices increased during 
2010. 
 The Case Shiller trend findings correlated with the overall tightening of the 
financial markets as the national foreclosure crisis grew. In the process, lending practices 
were scrutinized, credit rules squeezed, and those borrowers who were fueling the higher 
housing prices could no longer qualify for the larger loans. Essentially, the housing 
bubble began to deflate in 2006, and only started to rebound in late 2009.  
6
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1, U.S. 20-city Index Sources: S&P/Case-Shiller; NYTimes.com 
 A review of city-level housing markets for this period show the range of the 
housing bubble affects. The rise in housing prices in Phoenix, Las Vegas and Miami 
(Figures 2, 3, and 4) between 2001 and 2007 were remarkable. Annual price jumps often 
exceeded 20 percent. The underlying drivers of this inflation were high rates of 
population expansion, as well as, speculative investors. When the bubble burst, all three 
cities experienced price declines that have also exceeded the US average from 2007 
through 2009. 
Figures 5 and 6 offer parallel data for Denver and Dallas, but illustrate a different 
pattern. The housing price growth in these cities was less dramatic and tended to be lower 
than the US average. Ultimately, the price drop experiences in Denver and Dallas were 
less than those experienced elsewhere. Differences between local economies, growth 
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patterns, and housing construction industry offer insights into the differential. The 
economy in Texas and Colorado follows different cycles. They were originally centered 
on oil, natural gas, and agriculture, but have since diversified. The economies now 
include more service sector industries such as finance, education, and healthcare. These 
metro areas also have experienced lowered unemployment compared to the national 
average since the downturn of the economy in 2008 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). 
Finally, Atlanta and Charlotte were similar Sunbelt cities (Figures 7 and 8). Both 
have experienced sustained population growth. However, the two cities did not 
experience the hyper growth in housing prices as Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. The 
development in these two cities was driven more on internal demand rather than external 
speculative investment. Atlanta and Charlotte experienced modest growth in housing 
prices, more in line with Denver and Dallas. Likewise, their housing price drops were not 
as great in these over-inflated housing markets. But, they had larger prices drops than 
Denver and Dallas. The price drops in these cities also occurred later than the rest of the 
country. Atlanta did not register any year of year price drops until the end of 2007 and 
Charlotte did not show any decline until the beginning of 2007. One potential explanation 
was that their diverse service economies experienced the economic slowdown much later 
than other Sunbelt metros where housing speculation and construction sectors had a 
larger impact. 
Foreclosure 
In 2000, the US Census (2000) reported that there were approximately 70 million 
owner-occupied housing units in the United States. Roughly, 70 percent had some type of 
mortgage financing, or about 49 million units. Nationwide, approximately 150,000 
13
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mortgaged properties were entering foreclosure in 2000. Between 2000 and 2006, the rate 
of loans entering foreclosure remained around 0.3 percent, but other troubling changes in 
the housing market began to unfold. By 2007, the national average price of existing 
housing dropped from the previous year. In August 2006, for example, the average price 
of new housing in was $317,000. However, only three years later it had declined to 
$257,000 (US Census, 2010). 
With the drop in housing values, the number of homeowners with mortgages that 
exceeded the market value grew rapidly. These properties were labeled “underwater.” In 
real world terms, this means that a homeowner would lose money if she/he needs to sell 
the property. Beyond the collapse in real estate values, the development and marketing of 
new exotic mortgage products contributed to the rise in foreclosures. Alternative 
mortgage products, especially interest-only loans were especially destructive in 
contributing to weakening real estate markets.  With this type of mortgage, borrowers 
only paid interest on the principal balance during the early years of the loan period. The 
underlying attractiveness of these mortgages was predicated on a growing home equity 
and robust economic conditions that would allow loan holders to offer higher premiums 
as the mortgage matured. Ultimately, however, the combination of rising mortgage 
payments and dropping housing prices at the beginning of the century resulted in a 
national cascade of households defaulting on their mortgages and losing their homes to 
foreclosure. By 2007, the number of foreclosures increased dramatically, reaching 
approximately 1.1 percent of all single family, condominium or townhomes units or 
about 1,000,000 housing units.  
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Although the reasons for home foreclosures were complex, there were clear 
regional differences in the severity of foreclosures across the U.S. As seen in Figure 9, 
higher rates of foreclosure filings occurred in the West, Florida, and the Midwest. Lower 
rates of foreclosure filings occurred in the Great Plains as well in the Appalachian and 
New England regions. Fundamentally, the geographical variations were heavily affected 
by regional economic differences, the interstate and international of investment capital, 
and the degree of speculative development.  
While the collapse of regional or statewide mortgage home mortgage markets 
inflicted significant costs, the impact of mortgage foreclosure was most visible and 
impactful at a smaller geographical scale. Local governments have faced declining tax 
revenues, increased housing code compliance costs and police, fire and other service 
costs due to vacant structures. But, the most direct affects were perhaps at the 
neighborhood scale. Stories in the news media suggested that neighborhoods were 
differentially affected. Anecdotally, in lower income neighborhoods the loss of owner-
occupied households and drop in property values seemed to be more debilitating than the 
impacts in higher income neighborhoods. In turn, the structural effects of foreclosure 
appear to have translated into differences in neighborhood quality of life. Indeed, these 
questions around the localized impact of housing foreclosure were key to the research in 
this dissertation. 
Within the neighborhood or subdivision once a mortgage foreclosure occurred, 
the householder was removed from the property. While the loss of home was likely 
traumatic for the individual, the house was a durable good and continues to exist. In an 
environment where housing values were declining and foreclosures were increasing, the 
17
 
Source: RealtyTrac.com, 2010 Figure 9. Foreclosures by State, 2010 
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negative externality impacts of the surrounding neighborhood were likely significant. 
How does the number and concentration of foreclosed properties impact home prices? 
And, at what level can a neighborhood sustain an emptying of homes or a churning of 
occupants? This research project examined these questions. 
The scope and varying contexts surrounding recent mortgage foreclosure activity 
presented an opportunity to expand the core knowledge of housing studies. Previous 
housing research focused on the affects of homeownership rates on neighborhood 
conditions (Galster 1981, Galster et al. 1999, Grover 2006, Mackin 1997, Rohe, Van 
Zandt and McCarthy 2002). The preponderance of the literature found that higher levels 
of homeownership enhance neighborhood quality of life measures including economic, 
social, crime, and physical conditions. At the core, the higher levels of owner occupied 
residences make a neighborhood more attractive. 
The current collapse of the US housing market was unprecedented and largely 
unstudied. A review of the existing literature offered analyses of housing foreclosure at a 
regional or citywide scale. Little attention had been given to the impacts of mortgage 
foreclosure at a neighborhood level. This research project examined the impact of 
foreclosure on neighborhood single family properties. What were the impacts of vacant 
single family foreclosed properties on homeownership and the value of surrounding real 
estate? Were the accounts in the popular media that foreclosures devastate the economic 
and social fabric of the neighboring homeowners accurate or hyperbole? This research 
used primary data from Charlotte, North Carolina to examine these questions. Because 
this analysis was empirical, my findings were limited to one community. Nonetheless, 
this research did offer insights to the geography and urban studies research. In particular, 
19
 
 
 
 
 
it provided analyses into the effects of home foreclosure at a detailed scale not available 
in other studies. Moreover, the Charlotte study area provided a Sunbelt setting where a 
robust suburban housing market has been impacted differentially by housing market 
value. 
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CHAPTER 2: US HOUSING COLLAPSE: CONTEXTUAL AND POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
During the 1990’s, the US financial markets began to evolve in ways that 
radically changed the way US housing was financed; and that may ultimately have 
contributed to the housing market bust and financial market meltdown of 2008. This 
section will provide a brief overview of the types of mortgages used to finance home 
purchases. The mortgage background offers the basis for explaining the expanded 
opportunities of subprime lending and the rise in mortgage foreclosure and fraud. The 
impacts of these phenomena will be discussed in the overall collapse of the US housing 
market. 
 Traditional approaches to assisting low and middle-income home builders were 
structured around providing down payment assistance and low-interest loans to low-
income households. Participants were usually required to attend classes and training 
sessions to prepare them for homeownership (Van Zandt and Rohe 2006). Among the 
most progressive strategies for helping low-income families acquire homes was Habitat 
for Humanity. The Habitat model offered standard assistance, but also required the 
commitment of sweat equity from participants. By contributing time to help build other 
people’s time as well as their own, participants can build credit towards the down 
payment for their own home.
 
 
 
 
 
During the 1990’s, the federal government pursued a housing policy to increase 
the national homeownership rate. One critical tool in this goal was partnering with 
commercial banks to expand the opportunity for homeownership to lower wealth 
households that did not qualify for traditional mortgages. Figure 10 illustrates the 
different types of mortgages available to the consumer public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mortgages were divided into two categories: Conventional and Government. 
Government backed loans from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the 
Veterans Administration (VA) offer more stringent financial requirements and 
documentation in order to conform to government regulations. These agencies directly 
granted the loans and also guaranteed them. Conventional mortgages were broken into 
two categories: conforming and nonconforming. Conforming loans lent by commercial 
Home Mortgage Market 
Loan Type 
Conventional Government
Conforming Nonconforming Federal 
Housing 
Administration 
Veterans 
Administration 
Rural 
Housing 
Services 
Prime 
Alt-A 
Alt-A
Subprime
Jumbo
Source: Barth Figure 10. Type of Loans Available in the Mortgage 
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institutions had the same requirements of government loans so the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) purchased the mortgages. This process freed up capital for commercial 
lending institutions to originate more mortgages. Nonconforming loans were sold off to 
other commercial institutions or kept in their own portfolios. 
Both conforming and nonconforming loans had variants according to the credit 
worthiness of the borrower. Typically, conforming loans were classified as prime 
included households with unblemished credit records, or Alt-A loans with households 
with no credit history or undocumented income. Nonconforming loans included 
borrowers who had a good credit record, but needed a jumbo loan, that is, a loan that 
exceeded the maximum amounts that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would purchase. The 
remaining borrowers encompassed either subprime or Alt-A categories and fell outside 
the requirements of conforming loans. In addition, all loan types, either conforming or 
nonconforming had fixed or variable rate interest. Fixed rate mortgages were based on 
interest rates that do not change, while variable rate mortgages changed dependent on a 
prevailing interest index. The nonconforming loans will be discussed in more detail as 
they relate to mortgage foreclosure. 
Prior to the 21st century, there had been local housing booms that resulted in 
spectacular gains in housing prices. But generally the housing bubble would burst and 
prices would fall back to more reasonable levels. In the midst of these housing busts, new 
homeowners and speculators ended up owning properties that were potentially worth less 
than their mortgage. Nonetheless, the price declines did not usually exceed 10 to 15 
percent of the total housing values. In growing and robust real estate markets, housing 
23
 
 
 
 
 
busts were temporary and owners would soon show evidence of having positive equity in 
their homes. Most critically, foreclosure was usually not a consequence of a local housing 
bust. Most homeowners had fixed rate mortgages and were still able to meet their 
financial obligations (Immergluck 2008).  
Mortgage Foreclosure 
In current reporting on housing markets, the terms mortgage defaults and 
foreclosure were commonly used as interchanging descriptions. There was, however, a 
major difference between the terms. A mortgage default simply means multiple missed 
mortgage payments according to the terms of the loan. This resulted in the lender seeking 
repayment of the entire loan by selling the house at auction. There were many avenues 
the owner could take to prevent the house from being sold at auction. The most common 
was to declare bankruptcy, which did not change the terms of the mortgage, but provided 
the opportunity for the owner to restructure their debts in order to fulfill their mortgage 
obligations. However, if no preventative actions were taken, foreclosure occurred once 
the property was sold to someone else or the lender took possession of the property if the 
bid price was not high enough (Taylor 2010). 
As housing prices dropped across the country, many foreclosure auctions ended 
with the lender taking possession of the property. Increasingly, the mortgages exceeded 
the current value of the house and the bid prices were lower than the current mortgages 
on the house. Once the bank took possession of the house in a foreclosure process, the 
owners were required to vacate, and the house was usually sold at auction or through a 
real estate agent. In most cases, these mortgages were either backed by private mortgage 
insurance (PMI), or there was sufficient equity in the house that the resale of the house 
24
 
 
 
 
 
covered the costs of the mortgage and transaction costs (Seidenberg 2008). Following the 
closing of the home after an auction or when the lender had taken possession of the 
house, the property was then considered foreclosed.  
Subprime Lending 
As the financial requirements for homeownership loosened in the 1990’s and 
2000s, a larger pool of new home purchasers qualified for new mortgage products. These 
high risk mortgages, requiring much lower or no down-payments, were labeled as 
subprime mortgages. The terminology was derived from the mortgage interest rate that 
was not based on the prime interest rates used most often for the basis for most mortgage 
rates. Rather, the interest rates were higher to account for lower credit scores, the low or 
no down-payment, and increased risks of the borrower. While providing higher interest 
loans to lower income households sounds predatory, these loans provided easier access 
for many households denied access to homeownership in the past (Crossney 2010). In 
turn, households who were able to purchase modest homes at fixed subprime rates were 
more likely to enjoy the benefits of homeownership and increase their overall wealth 
(Agarwal et al. 2007).  
Between 1993 and 2003, the number of subprime loans across the US ranged 
between 2 and 8 percent of mortgage originations. However, the proportion increased 
substantially since 2003, and by 2006 exceeded 18 percent of the mortgage originations. 
Indeed, setting the stage for future problems (Fernald 2008). In contrast, by 2008, the 
proportion of subprime loans had contracted to 1 percent of originations (Barth et al. 
2009). 
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In particular, subprime loans structured around variable rates proved to be most 
problematic for the homeowner. Variable interest loans were based on the prime interest 
rate that changed monthly. Typically, at the start of the loan period, the interest rate was 
lower than fixed rate mortgages. The lower costs of variable interest mortgages were 
attractive to home buyers with budget constraints. In an environment where housing 
values were climbing and overall economic conditions were robust, variable rate 
mortgages were manageable and enhanced homeownership opportunities. But with 
housing market downturns, variable rates mortgages proved to be a problem for some 
subprime mortgage holders who were unable to keep up with their rising interest 
payments. In general, before 2002, the number of defaults under these programs did not 
prove to be a problem for the housing and financial markets as the foreclosed housing 
stock was quickly absorbed by other investors. However, as lending practices began to 
tighten after 2007 and foreclosures began to increase faster rate than they could be 
absorbed (Gerardi, Shapiro and Willen 2007). The supply of housing for sale including 
those already foreclosed quickly exceeded the demand for housing and housing prices 
dropped accordingly. 
Exotic Mortgages 
During the early years of the 21st century, increasingly complex and market 
oriented housing finance products were developed. The new brand of mortgages was 
commonly called exotic mortgages. They were especially successful in high cost housing 
markets. For example, in the Northeast and the West where median housing prices topped 
$500,000 and purchaser incomes requirements exceeded $100,000, mortgage providers 
marketed “teaser rates” for subprime and other mortgages. The term teaser rates or hybrid 
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loans referred to mortgage rate schedules that were artificially low for the first one to 
three years of the mortgage so as to make the mortgage payments affordable (Barth et al. 
2009).  Exotic mortgages were critical to maintaining robust real estate markets in 
communities with high demand and rapidly appreciating home prices. The buyers and 
lenders assumed that rising home equity would allow homeowners to refinance before the 
teaser rates expired. As the real estate bubble began to collapse, home owners could not 
refinance and the teaser rates expired. Too often, mortgage payments increased 
substantially and foreclosure followed (Barth et al. 2009). 
Another type of exotic mortgage product, Alt-A loans, were introduced during 
this time. These were a bit different than subprime mortgages, as the interest rates were 
based on the prime interest rates, but the terms of the loan were structured differently. 
One type of Alt-A mortgage is an interest-only loan. The borrower was required to pay 
only the interest on the loan. Interest-only loans enabled borrowers to enter more 
expensive markets without paying both interest and principal on the mortgage. There 
were significant advantages and risks to this product. For homebuyers who were likely to 
sell their house within five years, they were able to capture the tax benefits of owning a 
home. They would realize gains in housing prices without having to pay extra to towards 
the principal of the loan. For those who wanted to stay longer in their homes, there was a 
need to refinance their existing home into a new mortgage after five years or pay reset 
mortgage payment to recoup the missing principal payments. The underlying assumption 
for this group of mortgages was that escalating and growing equity of housing values 
would permit favorable terms on the loans (Immergluck 2008). 
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Another exotic mortgage category is the variable mortgage payment option. This 
product allowed borrowers to pay less than the interest payment on mortgages, while 
increasing the principal. The no documentation loan was another product. Under this 
arrangement, buyers with variable income could obtain mortgages without having to 
prove their income sources. Borrowers simply had to state what their income was on the 
application in order to qualify for the mortgage (Barth et al. 2009).  
Finally, the no down payment mortgage was widely marketed. This product was 
most prevalent with new housing. At first glance, this type of mortgage seemed to offer 
seller financing to homebuyers without putting money down. In real terms, however, 
sellers provided the down payment, but “reimbursed” in higher costs to the buyer at 
closing. Once the real costs to buyers were factored into expenses, the no down payment 
option adversely impacted home buyers future attachment to the house. Since the 
homeowner has no financial stake in the house, the homeowner viewed the house as an 
investment in economic terms rather as home for the purposes of maintaining a stable 
environment for the household.  
The no down payment mortgage was popular and especially attractive to first time 
home buyers, with lower incomes. These real estate buyers were heavily invested in 
‘starter subdivisions’, mass produced lower cost single family residential tracts. The 
Windy Ridge development in Charlotte drew national attention as prototypic of this type 
of mortgage collapse and resultant impacts (Geller 2011). Thus, the impacts of this 
product were magnified during the housing bubble. Indeed, as the values of low cost 
homes dropped or home buyers could not afford their payments, home owners abandoned 
their mortgages without losing large sums of money. In fact, media reports indicated that 
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as mortgage expenses increased and housing prices dropped, many homeowners owed 
more than their house was worth. Subsequently, the homeowner would walk away from a 
purchase, and rent a similar home in another neighborhood (Lowenstein 2010).  
Mortgage Fraud 
 Mortgage fraud created a whole class of homeowners who were more likely to 
lose their homes to foreclosure. Broadly speaking mortgage fraud was usually 
categorized into two groups. One form of mortgage fraud centered on a borrower 
providing false information on a mortgage loan application. The motive was to own a 
home. The perpetrator fully expects to meet the mortgage payments. The second category 
was mortgage fraud for profit.  This illegal activity included a mortgage broker, 
appraiser, real estate agent and home buyer. Fundamentally, all or some of these players 
provide false information in order to extract money from housing transactions (Fulmer 
2010). 
Fraud for Housing 
 When prospective homeowners provided false information on a loan application 
in order to buy a home, they were at risk for defaulting on their mortgage. With the 
weakening of lending requirements over the past decades, some prospective homeowners 
resorted to no-documentation loans or “liar” loans in order to obtain financing. In 
general, this meant that homeowners exaggerated their incomes in order to quality for 
mortgages they could not afford. During the 21st century real estate boom, there were 
extensive anecdotal reports of real estate professionals teaching or recruiting low wage 
home buyers how to qualify for mortgages (Fulmer 2010). Attracted by the opportunity to 
own a home or make profits in real estate, schemes were widespread. As housing markets 
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experienced strong growth and rapidly rising home values, the risk of fraud detection and 
foreclosure was marginalized. But as the US housing market deflated, these activities 
created individual and community wide negative impacts (Fulmer 2010). 
Fraud for Profit 
Widely covered by the media during the collapse of the housing market were 
accounts of mortgage fraud for profit. One widespread scam played out with developers 
working with real estate agents, appraisers, mortgage brokers, and closing agents to 
arrange overvalued real estate and excessive mortgage loans. Operationally, a real estate 
agent arranged for buyers who were willing to purchase homes at inflated prices with 
cooperating home builders. If the home buyer did not have sufficient income for a loan, 
the mortgage broker altered the application in order for the loan to be approved. The 
arrangement worked out well for those who were paid as the result of selling and closing 
the inflated mortgages. For example, the Charlotte region was the site of an ongoing 
federal investigation where perpetrators stole $7.3 million from lenders. Participants were 
drawn from California, Virginia as well as the local area. The current investigation and 
trial were the latest in the series of mortgage fraud cases in the Charlotte area during the 
past several years (Hopkins 2010). 
Another scenario was also played out with mortgage refinancing. Homeowners 
who wanted to capture home equity were victimized by predatory lenders.  In these cases, 
refinancing plans included excessive fees were tacked onto these loans eliminating 
financial advantages to home owners and structuring the loan that jeopardized their 
ability to repay the mortgage and losing the home to foreclosure (Fulmer 2010). 
Macro-level Mortgage Financial Meltdown 
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In the current global financial market place, most banks and lenders have changed 
their practices with respect to how they manage their mortgage portfolios. They no longer 
maintain their mortgages. Rather, mortgages were bought and sold to financial 
institutions who packaged them into bonds or other financial instruments that were sold 
to other investors. While the mortgage has been sold to investors, the mortgage servicing 
companies still managed the mortgage.  Although they may not actually own the loan, 
they received fees for managing the mortgage payments and related escrow accounts. 
 The practice of purchasing mortgages and bundling them into larger and diverse 
financial instruments for sale to other investors created another potential problem. 
Mortgage brokers had no incentive to make sure that the loans were sound. As long as the 
information provided by the borrower secured the loan, the mortgage was packaged and 
offered to an investor. The broker made money from closing the loan, and the lender 
made money from the sale of the mortgage, and the investor assumed the risk and 
potential costs of foreclosed real estate.  
Summary / Conclusions 
Taken alone, the array of weak or illegal mortgage practices discussed in this 
section were not responsible for the 21st century US housing financing crisis. However, 
the market excesses and fraud added another layer of complexity to the problem. Even in 
the recessionary environment, individual homeowners, who were unable to meet their 
mortgage obligations, received very little assistance from the mortgage servicing 
companies. Since they do not own the loan, these firms did not have any incentive to 
assist loan holders. Unlike consumer loans, mortgages were not easily changed and 
homeowners do not have many options once they defaulted on their mortgage. During the 
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housing boon period, a homeowner could potentially sell a house or refinance in order to 
fulfill the obligation of the mortgage. With the recent housing market collapse and the 
structure of new mortgage rules, most homebuyers were left with few choices. For 
example, refinancing may have required pre-payment penalties that exceeded the equity 
of homes. In some instances, homeowners may not be aware that second mortgages were 
included with the first mortgage. Since most of these homeowners who defaulted on their 
mortgage were unable to meet their current obligations, they were not likely to have the 
funds to refinance into mortgages they could afford (Fulmer 2010). 
 As noted earlier, housing market failures were attributable to a variety of 
individual, community, and regional components. Given the recency and evolving scope 
of home foreclosures, a fuller understanding and explanation was only beginning to 
emerge in the research literature at the time this project was underway (Foote, Gerardi 
and Willen 2008, Gerardi and Willen 2008, Hardin Iii and Wolverton 1996, Immergluck 
and Smith 2006, Daneshvary et al, 2011).  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In order to contextualize and better understand the relationships between 
foreclosures, homeownership, and housing prices, theoretical and empirical research in 
urban geography, economics, and urban planning offer critical guidance. This chapter 
presents a review of the literature. The discussion is organized into three sections. Part I 
presents a summary of theoretic and empirical foundations from urban geography 
relevant to questions of urban growth, housing markets and suburbanization. Part II looks 
at the literature surrounding the impacts of homeownership on households and 
neighborhoods. Finally, Part III reviews of the research surrounding neighborhood effects 
and housing prices. Recent work reporting on the intersection between urban housing 
markets and foreclosure is especially relevant to this study. 
Urban Geography: American Housing Market and Neighborhood Change 
A clear understanding of housing markets in the US is not possible without 
situating housing within urban geography and metropolitan change processes. Research 
has shown that as metropolitan areas develop, the housing stock around the center city 
ages, and market forces have pushed housing development further away from the center 
city (Alonso 1964). During the initial post-World War II period, new residential 
development outside the central metropolitan area accelerated. Attractive mortgage terms 
made homeownership more affordable. Transportation networks fostered greater access 
to lower cost land at greater distances from the center city. Suburban amenities such as 
 
 
 
 
 
open space, lower taxes, and larger and newer housing enhanced the demand to move out 
of the center city (Muth 1969).  
One of the most dramatic changes in the American housing market following 
World War II was the economics of homeownership. The growth of new housing was 
fueled by the liberalization of housing finance provided by the Federal Housing Agency 
(FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA). With the development of the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) just prior to World War II, the country 
experienced a significant growth in mortgage lending in the 1940’s. Financial institutions 
could originate mortgage loans and then sell them to Fannie Mae. Loan terms also 
became more accommodating. Households could borrow larger sums and pay it off over 
a longer period of time. Down payments decreased from 50 percent to 10 percent; and 
VA loans often required no down payments. Loan periods increased from 3 years to 30 
years. Mortgages could be refinanced to lower interest rates if they dropped. The 
cumulative impact was a dramatically changed mortgage market.  It was now possible for 
middle-income households to buy housing with loan payments that were less than rent.  
In the post-World War II economic boom, developers were able to leverage these 
new lending practices along with the expanding transportation infrastructure to build 
massive housing stock in the open spaces that surrounded the formerly compact cities 
(Weiss 1989). The expansion of the interstate system through and around center cities 
meant living outside the center city was possible with relatively little change in 
commuting times for automobile owners. The impact on cities was profound. Research in 
the New York City area found, for example, that a highway passing through the 
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metropolitan area reduced its population about 18 percent and increased the demand for 
housing in the surrounding suburbs (Baum-Snow 2007). 
Another crucial factor affecting the suburbanization trends was the age of 
American housing stock. As pre-World War II urban housing aged and deteriorated, 
maintenance costs increased and the value and desirability of this housing stock declined. 
With the combination of increased transportation access and newer housing options 
(Harris, Tolley and Harrell 1968), the processes of neighborhood filtering was more 
critical (Bruechner 1977). Neighborhood filtering refers to a downward spiral wherein 
older housing becomes less desirable, passed over as higher income and more mobile 
households are attracted to newer housing opportunities. In turn, the older housing was 
occupied by lower income populations (Brown 1985, Guest 1974, Harrison 1974, 
MacDonald 1985). In cities with active immigrant streams, these housing units were also 
likely to be occupied by the newest arriving immigrant groups. Ultimately, the filtering 
process led to neighborhood renewal as urban areas restructure and areas with older 
housing were subject to gentrification.  
Shifting socio-economic status in neighborhood populations provides evidence for 
the ecological model of neighborhood changes. The Chicago School model suggests the 
demographic drivers for the ecological model were linked to the aging of the housing 
stock (Park 1925, Kain and Apgar 1979, Sternlieb and Hughes 1974). At its core this 
model posits that as new housing was added to a metropolitan area, the population 
demographics of existing older neighborhoods begin to change (Sternlieb and Hughes 
1974). Since World War II, Americans have traditionally been moving to newer housing 
away from the center city (Kain and Apgar 1979). The new housing was centered around 
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edge cities and other subcenter areas around the center city (Anas 1998). In turn, this 
opens up inner city housing options for lower income households (Ingram and Kain 
1973). The filtering process has allowed for new populations to move into areas once 
considered unaffordable (Sternlieb and Hughes 1974).  
In addition to the aging of the housing stock, the demographic characteristics of 
the residential housing market were impacted by economics and discrimination (Cutler, 
Glaeser and Vigdor 1999, King 1978). Across the U.S. housing market, the price of 
housing was influenced by neighborhood socio-economic status. Since non-white 
Americans have traditionally earned lower household incomes, minority households have 
been more concentrated in areas with lower cost housing and less desirable housing 
options (Fischer 2004). In addition to housing segregation based upon economic status, 
racial or ethnic discrimination in employment and social relations extended to property 
rights and homeownership.   
Racially based discrimination has played a significant role in the American 
housing market (King 1978). On the government side, FHA began in 1934, provided the 
majority of housing finance until the 1950s. During that time, FHA systematically used 
administrative practices to maintain the social and racial makeup of neighborhoods. In 
practical terms, most of the FHA money went towards moving white households to the 
suburbs (Squires and O'Connor 2001). In addition, the FHA promoted the usage of 
restrictive covenants that prevented white homeowners selling their homes to non-white 
homeowners (Kimble 2007). While these restrictive covenants were deemed illegal by 
the Supreme Court in 1948 (Squires and O'Connor 2001), FHA had defined 
neighborhoods based on race and determined which areas lenders could provide 
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financing for home purchase and improvement (Kimble 2007). This practice called, 
“redlining”, was a widely accepted practice among mortgage lenders. The term redlining 
was derived from lender maps, where areas of inner-cities with higher proportions of 
minorities were outlined in red on maps. In lender’s decision making, these target areas 
would not receive approval for home mortgage loans or home equity loans. With few 
options for improvement or new building, the housing in redlined areas would not be 
improved nor replaced. Lacking funds for improvements, redlined neighborhoods would 
be noticeably more deteriorated than other parts of the city. As a result, housing sales in 
the discriminated area were adversely affected, from both financing and marketing 
perspectives. 
When these overt discrimination practices were removed with the passage the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1974, more subtle ways of 
discrimination were practiced by some real estate agents. For example, there was 
persistent evidence that, minority households were consistently steered toward existing 
minority neighborhoods (Galster 1990, Ondrich, Ross and Yinger 2001, Minerbrook 
1993). Taken together, social practices; supporting government and corporate housing 
policies; and classic economic behavior have resulted in segregated housing markets 
widespread across the United States.  
The degree of housing segregation in a city or metropolitan area has also been 
shaped by the history of suburban housing development. In the Northeast and Midwest, 
where the majority of housing stock was built before 1970, hyper-segregated inner cities 
have developed (Massey 1989). In the older urban metropolitan regions, the traditional 
sorting process was marked by sharp demographic differences. As the white population 
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moved out to the suburban ring, the population inner-city neighborhoods became less 
diverse.  
In contrast, in the South and West, the recent large scale housing development 
and population migration has resulted in less segregated cities (Massey 1988, Wyly and 
Hammel 2004). Moreover, The sorting processes in the newer western and southern 
metros, post 1980’s, was more closely related to economics as opposed to race. Housing 
segregation was also impacted by neighborhood level characteristics rather than inner-
city versus suburban differences. Specifically in Southern cities and towns, adjacent 
neighborhoods may display very different racial characteristics based upon the historical 
roots of the neighborhood. It was not uncommon, for example, for wealthy, white, large 
lot neighborhoods to be adjacent to low wealth, black, and small lot neighborhoods. The 
proximity occurs as a result of historical employer-laborer relationships (Rogers and 
Rogers 1996).  
Classic neighborhood change models and housing segregation do not, however, 
account for all the variability in the complex urban housing markets. Clearly, other 
variables were impacting urban housing structure beyond urban geography. In particular, 
the age of housing, and the demographics of the residents were important factors. For 
instance, the urban restructuring processes that dominated housing supply and 
characteristics in the Northeast and the Midwest were less important to understanding 
housing conditions in the South and West. The Sunbelt housing markets over the past 30 
years have produced new patterns of residential geography that do not adhere to the 
traditional models of neighborhood change.  
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One important example of this regionalism is gentrification. While gentrification 
has traditionally been a phenomenon that was strongly represented in Northeast and 
Midwest cities, the trend in some southern cities did not involve the usual process. The 
classic gentrification model was initiated by “urban pioneers” who settle in low wealth 
inner city neighborhoods and initiated the process of housing rehabilitation and economic 
revitalization. In parts of the South, however, who viewed gentrification was a tool for 
business development. This was the case in Charlotte’s Fourth Ward where gentrification 
was prompted by the corporate interests (Smith and Graves 2005). Clearly, the traditional 
gentrification has taken place in large southern cities, notably Atlanta and Dallas. But, 
gentrification did not occur at the same level as Northeastern and Midwestern cities. One 
explanation for this divergence posits that recency of urbanization in Southern cities and 
the lesser degrees of segregation, the areas of traditional gentrification in the central cities 
were less defined (Wyly and Hammel 2004). 
Another significant difference in the South was incipient immigrant settlement. 
With the emerging Hispanic hypergrowth across the South during the last decades of the 
20th century, newcomers did not settle in the traditional inner-city locations. Rather, the 
Latino immigrants concentrated in the mature suburbs. In terms of Charlotte, North 
Carolina, they have concentrated in the numerous multi-family housing units that line the 
transportation corridors (Smith and Furuseth 2004). 
New suburban developments in Southern cities have followed both the traditional 
development model, but with twists. Along with the large lot development in distant 
suburbs, small lot and smaller sized housing development have also grown up along the 
suburban fringe. A popular term for these starter home developments was “vinyl 
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villages”, referring to the low cost plastic siding materials used by home builders. From a 
financial perspective, these developments have been heavily capitalized by sub-prime 
mortgages. As a part of this framework, developers utilized incentives to allow many 
households to move in with little or money down. Ultimately, many of these 
developments began to show the first signs of the foreclosure crisis (Paulsen 2009, 
Crouch 2005, Appelbaum 2006). 
Taken together, the experience of Sunbelt cities are representations and models 
for informing the pattern of foreclosure activity in Mecklenburg County. In turn, the 
classic urban settlement geography from the pre World War II and earlier neighborhood 
filtering processes reported in research sites like Chicago and New York has less 
significance.  
Impacts of Homeownership 
For many American households in the last half of the 20th century, buying and 
owning a home was a goal that required years of saving and planning. The generic 
framework was straightforward. Homeownership meant a 20 percent down payment plus 
closing costs before a bank would be willing to lend the money to first time home-buyers. 
The critical gap to achieving the “American Dream” was the large down payments. These 
significant upfront costs were a barrier for many low-income households who were 
unable to save the money required for a down payment and other transaction costs related 
to purchasing a home (Goodman 1988, Henderson and Ioannides 1983). 
The financial barriers also translated into longer rental periods for households. 
That is to say, even middle-income households who could meet income requirements for 
loans had to delay purchases while saving for the down payments. This was especially 
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relevant in high priced housing markets in the Northeast and West. For existing 
homeowners, the high down payment barrier was also a powerful incentive to avoid 
mortgage failure, or risk losing their initial investment. Indeed, a bank foreclosure for 
many middle class homeowners translates into a financial wipeout. 
Benefits of Homeownership 
Despite the challenges and risk, home ownership emerged as a principal tenet of 
financial security and economic success in the US. In turn, a wide array of empirical 
literature and professional research studies sustain this ethos with support for the benefits 
of homeownership. These data attribute positive gains to individuals, neighborhoods, and 
overall communities.   
At a fundamental level, households living in owner-occupied housing showed 
significantly higher rates of wealth. Indeed, traditionally homeowners have enjoyed a 
strong tax benefit.  With a deduction for mortgage interest, homeowners have a reduced 
tax liability compared to households who pay similar costs in rent. Along with the 
mortgage deductions, the potential increase in housing value provided an opportunity for 
low and high income households to accumulate equity in their property. In a study of 
home buyers across the U.S., researchers found that low-income households experienced 
net-worth increases of almost $25,000 with down payments as low as $1800. The study 
period between 1998 and mid 2003 indicated that housing values increased in at about 
5.5 percent a year (Stegman, Quercia and Davis 2007).  
The social benefits of homeownership are broad and widely researched. These 
advantages include more stable home environments, positive outcomes for school aged 
children, enhanced psychological health, increased civic engagement, and lower rates of 
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crime (Rohe et al. 2002). One caveat, the literature suggested that social benefits may be 
the result of homeowner characteristics. Thus, proving causality was challenging 
(Coulson 2002).  
The stable home environment associated with homeownership correlated with 
reduced household mobility. Underlying this relationship was the large financial 
investment and transaction cost, homeowners were more tied to a location than renters 
(Rohe et al. 2002). The stable home environment also fostered social ties within the 
neighborhood (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997).  
Enhanced educational outcomes were also found in neighborhoods with higher 
homeownership rates (Galster 2007). Children living in an owner-occupied households 
achieved higher test scores (Haurin, Parcel and Huarin 2002) and were less likely to drop 
out of school (Aaronson 2000, Green R.K. and White 1997). Moreover, they were twice 
as likely to go to college (Harkness and Newman 2003). Children living in owner-
occupied homes were less likely to present behavioral problems (Haurin et al. 2002). In 
addition, they were less likely to give birth as an unmarried teenager (Harkness and 
Newman 2003). 
Homeownership and improved psychological health were linked according to 
national surveys. Homeowners report that they were happier and have a higher self-
esteem (Rossi 1996). But, importantly, positive psychological impacts were only present 
when the homeowner was note behind on their mortgage payments and not experiencing 
any financial stress related to housing (Rohe et al. 2002). 
From a community engagement perspective, homeowners were more likely to be 
involved in their local community. This connection was displayed in community 
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improvement activities and voting behavior (Rossi 1996). Specifically, homeowners were 
13 percent more likely to know local politicians, and 16 percent more likely to vote in 
local elections (DiPasquale 1999). According to researchers, elevated engagement 
probably had an economic rationale. Simply stated, homeowners were interested in 
maintaining their investment. They believed that local politics and neighborhood 
conditions affected property values and equity in their homes (Rohe et al. 2002).  
Other research suggests that homeownership influenced the crime rate, with 
communities that had higher than average rates of homeownership experiencing lower 
than average rates of both property and violent crime (Alba 1994). In Chicago, a study 
suggested that the aggravated assault rate was lower in neighborhoods with higher 
proportions of homeowners (Sampson et al. 1997). The preponderance of research on 
housing and crime suggested that homeowners were less likely to experience both violent 
and property crime than renters (Dietz 2003). 
Neighborhood and Housing Externalities  
The utility or value of residential real estate was impacted by a variety of factors. 
Among the most powerful were the in situ characteristics of the property. Basically, 
homes that offered more space, amenity values or a prized location had higher value. In 
the world of residential real estate, bigger homes, larger lots, and affluent neighborhoods 
command higher values.  
Beyond these dimensions, location in space and proximity to other housing and 
services played a significant role in establishing residential property value. From a 
theoretical perspective, fundamental spatial concepts discussed by Nystuen (1963) such 
as distance and connection frame property valuation. In turn, they were expressed in the 
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key spatial constructs of accessibility and neighborhood. Quoting Tobler’s famous ‘first 
law of geography, everything was related to something else, but near things were more 
related than distant things’ (Tobler 1970). Therefore, any changes to the quality of 
housing and services were more likely to impact housing in closer proximity and had less 
of an impact as the distance increased. 
Externalities or spillover effects models were developed to assess these 
geographical differences surrounding housing (Lynch and Rasmussen 2004, Quigley 
1985). Structurally, externalities were classified into nuisances and amenities. Nuisances 
refer to impacts that negatively impact property values. They included a physical element 
such as a trash dump (Hite et al. 2001) or a contextual characteristic, like violent crime, 
that is experienced in a neighborhood (Tita, Petras and Greenbaum 2006). As the 
nuisance becomes more significant, that is, combined with other externalities or its 
geographical proximity was closer, the impacts on home values were exacerbated. 
The term amenities referred to positive externalities. They included enhanced 
individual real estate values or improved collective housing values. They can also be 
place specific. For example, a park within walking distance of a home was considered an 
amenity, especially for families (Hendon 1971). Amenities may be contextual, for 
instance, housing located in neighborhoods in top performing school zones. Operationally 
as amenities increased or were sited within walking distance, housing prices were higher 
compared to house without the amenity (Nechyba 1998). 
A broad set of literature documents the economic impacts of externalities on 
housing values. Among the foci of these studies were empirical investigations looking at 
the impacts of increased transportation options, school quality, proximity to public 
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housing and crime. Most recently, the impacts of foreclosure have attracted increased 
research attention. 
The externality effects of a wide array of transportation options and access to 
mass transit have been examined. Housing located within walking distance of train 
stations and light rail transit stops have been shown to have higher rates of property value 
appreciation than similar properties farther away (Bowes 2001, Lin 2002, Kahn 2007). 
Empirical research by Bowes (2001) in Atlanta found that property value appreciation 
was more significant with stations farther away from the center city and in neighborhoods 
with higher incomes. In Chicago, residential property values adjacent to rail stations 
experienced a 20 percent increase relative to properties located one-half mile away (Lin 
2002). Related work found that neighborhoods originally designed to provide access to 
public transportation by sidewalks had higher appreciation of residential property values 
than neighborhoods designed to access public transportation by car (Kahn 2007).  
School choice and quality have framed a number of studies arguing the positive 
relationship between school quality and housing prices. Research in Boston showed that 
parents were willing to pay 2.5 percent more for housing if the choice yielded for a 5 
percent increase in their children’s test scores (Black 1999). In Shaker Heights, Ohio, a 
change in school assignment from neighborhood schools resulted in a drop of housing 
values of 9.9 percent (Bogart and Cromwell 2000). In Charlotte, the changing school 
assignment system back to neighborhood schools resulted in an increase in housing prices 
in border neighborhoods of up to 10 percentage points with an increase of one standard 
deviation of test scores (Kane, Staiger and Reigg 2005). Taken together, the body of 
research suggested that areas with better schools, determined by higher test scores have 
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either higher cost housing or housing prices that appreciate faster than areas with lower 
test scores.  
Land use and infrastructure design have been shown to have disparate impact on 
housing desirability. Empirical research by Song (2004) in Portland, Oregon, showed 
mixed used developments had positive relationships with housing prices. Specifically, if 
real estate developments had a combination of residential and non-residential 
development, the value of single family houses was enhanced. However, if single family 
homes were located in close proximity to multi-family housing then real estate prices 
were depressed (Song 2004). Other variables in the Portland research such as proximity 
to bus stops and nearness to major roadways resulted in lower prices from homebuyers.  
In contrast the effects of open space and access to recreation on housing prices 
were more generally positive. In Rancho Bernado, California, for example, golf courses 
increased the value of adjacent housing by 5 percent (Grudnitski and Do 1997). While in 
the Charlotte area, single family homes increased in value by $3,200 if they were within a 
mile of a greenway (Campbell and Munroe 2007). 
Crime and housing prices have also been examined frequently and tested at 
various geographic levels. In Jacksonville, Florida, housing prices in high crime 
neighborhoods were 39 percent lower than similar houses in other neighborhoods (Lynch 
2001). Research in Columbus, Ohio, capitalized the cost of crime into the price of 
housing. When the violent crime rate declined in high crime neighborhoods, the average 
housing price increased by $40,000. Moreover, $15,000 was attributed to the change in 
violent crime (Tita et al. 2006). In New York City, as crime dropped in high crime 
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neighborhoods, about one-third of the upward change in housing prices was attributed to 
the change in crime (Schwartz, Susin and Voicu 2003).  
Foreclosure Research 
 In the wake of this decade’s foreclosure epidemic, the popular media raised 
questions surrounding the relationships between foreclosures, homeownership and 
housing prices (Leinberger 2008, Gerardi and Willen 2008, Powell and Roberts 2009). In 
particular, the dominant theme in the media was that foreclosure was nationally pervasive 
and aspatial. That is to say, foreclosure activity affected all parts of the country and all 
types of neighborhoods equally. When looking at the impacts of foreclosure, the media 
story has been that the loss of homeownership produces negative spillovers well beyond 
the effect on the homeowners. Unfortunately, owing to the lack of consistent national 
foreclosure data sets only modest research had directly examined these assumptions 
(Hammel, 2008). 
 Nonetheless, a growing body of research has looked at the relationship of 
predatory lending, subprime loans, and foreclosures (Newman, 2008). In the Washington 
DC metro areas, for example, research showed that lower middle class and working class 
neighborhoods were targeted for subprime loans even though householders could qualify 
for prime rate loans. These same neighborhoods were historically overlooked by the 
mainstream lenders (Wyly, 2006). Indeed by 2006, mortgage default rates in low-income 
and minority neighborhoods, with higher rates of subprime lending, were growing rapidly 
(Belsky, 2008).  
Work by Kaplan (2008) in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, showed evidence of “reverse 
redlining” in inner city neighborhoods. His analyses found that neighborhoods that were 
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once excluded from traditional redlining practices were suddenly the object of predatory 
lending practices of subprime mortgage opportunities. Analyzing the 2007 shifts in 
Cleveland’s foreclosures from inner-city neighborhoods to the suburbs, Kaplan 
uncovered an interesting dichotomy in the causes of foreclosures. Specifically, 
foreclosure in inner-city neighborhoods was a result of subprime lending standards, while 
foreclosure in outer ring suburbs resulted from households buying too much house 
(Kaplan, 2008).  
One structural shift in the lending market relating to neighborhood pattern of 
foreclosures was a bifurcation of the mortgage market. In particular, Wyly (2004) 
reported that professional investors gentrifying inner city neighborhoods were likely to 
receive traditional mortgage products, while existing property owners in the same 
neighborhoods were targeted by lenders providing subprime mortgage options. 
In Minneapolis, foreclosure activity in low-income minority neighborhoods was 
linked to investor activity. Empirical research by Crump (2008) found that renters were 
being evicted after outside investors abandoned their property and homes were sold at 
auction. The work suggests that low income renter households were not immune from the 
neighborhood scaled impacts of foreclosure.  
In line with other neighborhood externality effects, a growing body of scholarship 
has begun to focus on the impact of foreclosure activity. Broadly speaking, increasing 
foreclosure rates have been linked to elevated levels of crime, code enforcement 
violations, along with a decline in housing prices (Immergluck and Smith 2006). Recent 
work in New York City found that residential property sales located within 1000 feet of a 
foreclosure filing sold for 3.9 percent less than those greater than 1000 feet from a 
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foreclosure (Schuetz, Been and Ellen 2008). In Chicago, the drop in property values as 
the result of a foreclosure within a one-half mile ranged from 1.2 percent to 8.7 percent 
(Lin, Rosenblatt and Tao 2009). In Las Vegas, the drop in market sale prices as the 
results of foreclosure within a one-half mile ranged from 1 to 2 percent while controlling 
for the macro-level housing market crash since 2007 (Danshvary 2011). 
Although the empirical research on the impacts of foreclosure was recent and 
modest, relative to other externality-related studies, one inference from the data was that 
foreclosure activity may be the catalyst for long term neighborhood change. Consider that 
in Chicago, evidence showed that 16 of the city’s 77 low and moderate income owner 
occupied neighborhoods suffered 42 percent of the citywide foreclosure filings between 
2000 and 2007. The impact of geographically concentrated foreclosures suggests a new 
process of neighborhood turnover.  This phenomenon is called the “Foreclosure Effect” 
(Ashton, 2008).  
Locally, the Windy Ridge neighborhood in suburban Northwest Charlotte had 
become a nationwide poster case for the geographically clustered foreclosure 
neighborhoods in greenfield sites. Observational evidence for Windy Ridge since 2003 
reported that as widespread foreclosure occurred in this community, the negative 
economic and social changes were rapid and cumulative. Indeed, in some heavily 
impacted suburban started home communities in Mecklenburg County, the number of 
owner-occupied housing declined from 80 percent to below 30 percent in a 12 month 
period2. Anecdotally, as the number or concentration of vacant houses increased, the 
                                                 
2 Data extracted from Mecklenburg County Property Records from 2003-2007. 
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processes associated with long term neighborhood decline emerged in short time frames. 
In particular, suburban neighborhoods were victim to the crime and code enforcement 
problems associated with low-income inner-city neighborhoods (Taylor 2010).  
With the increase in foreclosure activity across many American cities, it is 
important to better understand the impacts on housing prices and homeownership at the 
neighborhood level.  During the past seven years, foreclosure activity in Charlotte and 
Mecklenburg County has emerged as a significant public policy issue. Indeed, in 2009 
the US Department of Justice (DOJ) sponsored a two day national research focused 
conference focused on empirical research around foreclosure and crime. Charlotte was 
selected as the meeting site. In choosing Charlotte, the DOJ conference organizers noted 
the rapidly growing scale of foreclosure in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and posited that 
Charlotte was prototypic of the new urban phenomenon – suburban focused foreclosure 
(DOJ 2009).
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA 
 
 
Single family housing foreclosures have negative impacts that transcend the 
personal tragedy to the homeowner. Commentators speak in broad terms about the impact 
on surrounding residential home owners, neighborhood and communities. But quantified 
effects are absent. This research is designed to address this gap in understanding. The 
research plan proposed in this study posits that a significant association existed between 
foreclosure activity, housing prices and homeownership in Charlotte, North Carolina.  
 Through this analytical lens, this study examines the spatial dynamics of the 
relationships between foreclosure activity and the surrounding geography. While this 
research is empirical and therefore lacks direct transferability to other urban areas, it does 
provide a unique assessment of the neighborhood level impacts of single family housing 
foreclosure. 
Mortgage Foreclosure Activity and Housing Prices 
 In order to assess the strength of the relationships, a series of hypotheses were 
tested using geographical and temporal constructs. A core assumption of the study was 
that mortgage foreclosures activity created a negative pricing externality on surrounding 
residential properties. Four hypotheses were tested in line with this assumption.  
Hypothesis #1 - As the proportion of foreclosures in a residential community increased, 
the housing sale prices for other homes in the community were adversely affected. 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis #2 - The market sale price of a residential property was adversely impacted 
by the close proximity to existing foreclosed housing units. 
Hypothesis #3 - The longer the average time period of mortgage foreclosed residential 
properties in a neighborhood, the more severe the negative price impact upon 
neighborhood residential units.  
Hypothesis #4 - The market sale of a residential property was influenced by the structural 
attributes of the individual property, neighborhood quality of life characteristics, 
temporal, and locational elements. 
Mortgage Foreclosure and Homeownership 
 The research plan also posited that residential foreclosure in a neighborhood had a 
negative impact on homeownership, that is, housing was less likely to be owner occupied 
in the community with higher incidents of foreclosure. Four hypotheses have been 
constructed to assess this assumption. 
Hypothesis #5 - As the proportion of foreclosures in a residential community increased, 
the level of homeownership was adversely influenced.  
Hypothesis #6 - Homeownership was adversely impacted by the close proximity to 
existing or recently foreclosed housing units. 
Hypothesis #7 - The longer the average time period of mortgage foreclosure in the 
neighborhood, the more severe the negative impact upon residential homeownership.  
Hypothesis #8 - Homeownership was influenced by the structural attributes of the 
individual property, neighborhood quality of life characteristics and locational elements. 
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Mortgage Foreclosure and Housing Prices Methods 
The proposed methodology for explaining the impact of foreclosures on housing 
prices was a hedonic price model (Bastian 2002) using regression statistics. 
Fundamentally, the model assumed that the price of residential real estate depends upon 
the internal characteristics of the product and external factors affecting the utility of the 
home. The model was used to test Hypotheses #1 through #4. The dependent variable 
was housing sales price. The independent variables of the model were expressed in terms 
of their strength in explanatory power.  If a particular independent variable had a large 
positive or negative value, then the variable displayed greater influence on the outcome 
of the dependent variable. If the value was close to zero, then the variable was said to 
have less influence on the dependent variable.  
In using the hedonic approach, the factors that influence property values were 
structured in five groups: housing structural characteristics, neighborhood level attributes 
temporal dimensions, distance measures, and foreclosure characteristics. 
The model was expressed as:  
Ln3 (P) = ß1 + ßSXS + ßNXN + ßTXT + ßDXD + ßFXF + μ 
where P = the housing price of the specific housing unit; ß1 = intercept; ßSXS = structural 
variables; ßNXN = neighborhood level variables; ßTXT = temporal variables; ßDXD = 
distance variables; ßFXF = foreclosure variables; μ represents the degree of error in the 
model.  
                                                 
3 When the price of housing was plotted with housing size, the relationship was not linear. Therefore, the 
price of housing was logged in order to produce a more linear relationship in the model (Makridakis, 1998).  
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Figure 11 presents a graphical representation of the hedonic price model. Detailed 
descriptions of the five independent variable groupings are also contained in this 
diagram. 
 
Figure 11. Graphical Representation of the Hedonic Housing Sale Value Model 
  
Structural Attributes 
# of bedrooms, # of baths, heated
square feet, lot size, age, siding, 
foundation, housing quality, # of
stories, and HVAC 
  
Neighborhood Attributes 
Neighborhood characteristics:,
 social, crime, physical,  
economic, and city services 
Distance Attributes  
Distance to the central business
district and major roads 
 
 
Temporal Attributes  
Year and quarterly time of 
property transaction 
  
Foreclosure Attributes 
Ratio of foreclosures in
neighborhood, proximity of 
foreclosure, and length of
foreclosure 
 
Housing 
Sale Value  
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Mortgage Foreclosure and Home Ownership Methods 
Logistic regression was used to test the strength of association between 
homeownership status and foreclosures in a residential community. Logistic regression is 
used to predict the outcome of a binary variable which has only two values. Therefore, a 
logistic regression model consisted of several independent variables to predict the 
probability of a homeownership status. Thus, the dependent variable was either owner-
occupied or renter occupied. The model was used to test Hypotheses #5 through #8. The 
independent variables of the model were expressed using an odds ratio. If a particular 
independent variable exhibited a large positive or negative value, then the variable was 
more likely to influence the outcome of the dependent variable. If the value was close to 
zero, then the variable was said to have less influence on the dependent variable. Using 
this model, the factors that influence homeownership were structured in five groups. As 
in the previous model, these groups were housing structural characteristics, neighborhood 
level attributes temporal dimensions, distance measures, and foreclosure characteristics. 
The model was expressed as: 
H =  ß1 + ßSXS + ßNXN + ßTXT + ßDXD + ßFXF + μ 
where H = owner-occupancy of a specific unit; ß1 = intercept; ßSXS = structural variables; 
ßNXN = neighborhood level variables; ßTXT = temporal variables; ßDXD = distance 
attributes; ßFXF = foreclosure attributes; μ represents the degree of error in the model.  
Figure 12 presents a graphical representation of the logistic regression model and 
describes the information within the five independent variable groups. 
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Figure 12. Graphical Representation of the Logistic Regression Model 
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Study Area 
The study area for the research was the City of Charlotte, North Carolina and its 
Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction (ETJ), that is, those areas that will be annexed to the city 
following sufficient population gains. The political geography is depicted in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13, Municipal Boundaries in Mecklenburg County 
Source: Charlotte Mecklenburg Planning Commission, 2009 
 
The municipal boundaries of Charlotte encompassed a majority of Mecklenburg 
County. Because the State of North Carolina annexation rules were flexible and tend to 
advantage local governments, Charlotte was able to regularly annex new residential 
areas. Within the governmental framework, land subdivision and zoning regulations are 
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business friendly and produce uniformly similar residential development patterns. My 
study area was chosen for three reasons. First, the Charlotte study area provided an 
opportunity to analyze the real estate market under relatively normal real estate 
conditions. The study area had increasing prices during the proposed study period of 
2003-2007. However, Charlotte was less impacted by the national housing “boom and 
bust,” characterized by external factors that artificially inflated housing prices and then 
experienced the sharp decline in housing prices. Second, the study area was experiencing 
an increased number of foreclosures during a period that housing prices were increasing. 
Indeed, foreclosures jumped from 1,500 annually in 2002 to over 2,000 in 2004. This 
trend suggested that certain neighborhoods were experiencing higher levels of 
foreclosures that might be expected to have impacted the effected neighborhoods 
differently from non-impacted neighborhoods. Finally, considering the expected spatial 
differentiation of foreclosure impacts across neighborhoods, the Charlotte data presented 
the opportunity to assess changes over time as neighborhood evolved and therefore, 
established a better model for analysis. 
Within the Charlotte study area, 173 neighborhood scale subareas were identified. 
These neighborhood statistical areas (NSAs) have been used on the city’s neighborhood 
quality of life study since 20004. The neighborhood boundaries are represented in Figure 
13. While NSAs do not match existing census geographies, they reflect community 
derived neighborhood boundaries. Thus, they were socially constructed rather than based 
upon externally generated boundaries. Operationally, NSA boundaries provided a 
                                                 
4 The Neighborhood Quality of Life Study was a biennial report completed by UNC Charlotte Metropolitan 
Studies and Extended Academic Programs for the City of Charlotte’s Neighborhood Development. 
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template to assess neighborhood longitudinal change as they have been maintained for 
the entire study period. Since the existing boundaries were consistent, city, county, and 
non-profit organizations have used the NSA framework to measure and guide 
neighborhood change studies across the community. In turn, other cities such as 
Chesapeake, VA have replicated this approach and many others, as part of the Urban 
Institutes National Neighborhood Indicators Project5 created a framework for similar 
neighborhood quality of life studies. 
Research Data 
 A research database contained 72,061 records.  This encompassed all single 
family residential market sales and single family homeownership in Charlotte between 
2003-2007. One caveat, the dataset excluded single family detached housing 0.5 mile 
from the Charlotte study area boundary. The exclusion was to make all points comparable 
when a proximity analysis was conducted since adjacent property records outside the 
boundary were not available. Townhomes and condominiums data were also excluded 
because of the anticipated differences in the variables affecting purchasing behavior. 
Further, in order to eliminate outliers and removed non-market sale transactions, housing 
units transaction priced below $20,000 and above $1,000,000 were excluded. Transaction 
prices below $20,000 were not considered a market sale since they were not arms-length 
transaction6. The few transactions above $1,000,000 were removed in order to normalize 
the analysis. Since there were very few foreclosures above this price range, the impact on 
the overall analysis was minimal. Other outlier categories included houses that were 
                                                 
5 http://www2.urban.org/nnip/ 
6 An arm’s length transaction occurs when the buyer and seller do not know each other prior to the sale. 
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larger than 5,000 square feet and residential properties larger than 134,680 square feet for 
3 acres, were removed. The latter properties were often sold for development and not for 
living in the existing housing.  
The market sale database was also stratified by assessed value to analyze the 
differences across the different value groups. Assessed values were used instead of 
market price to maintain uniformity of the analyses with the foreclosure variables. Since 
foreclosures are not “market sales”, it is not possible to group them unless a standard 
measure of value based on the assessment is used.  
Following the sorting process, the dataset was structured in three assessed value 
groups: less than $150,000, $150,000 to $250,000, and greater than $250,000. The 
assessed value ranges were chosen based upon the median household income for 
Charlotte. Houses valued under $150,000 were considered affordable to very low to low-
income households. Houses valued between $150,000 and $250,000 were assumed 
affordable for middle-income working family households. And, it was expected that 
upper-income households would be able to buy homes valued above $250,000.  
The data used to test the proposed hypotheses were drawn primarily from local 
government data sources. As detailed below, two independent variables, 32 continuous 
variables and 68 dummy variables were utilized in the research. A listing of the 
dependent and independent variables were presented in Table 2, along with a description 
of the variables. 
The dependent variables, housing price (LPRICE) and homeownership 
(H_OWNER) data were extracted from the Register of Deeds in Mecklenburg County, 
North Carolina. When a property was sold in Mecklenburg County, the contract sales 
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Table 2: Variable List 
Variable Name Variable Description 
LPRICE LN Sale Price 
H_OWNER Homeownership Status two years post transaction 
Structural Attributes 
AGE Age of House at Sale 
AGE2 Age of House at Sale Squared (Transformed Data) 
AGE3 Age of House at Sale Cubed (Transformed Data) 
BEDS Number of Bedrooms 
FBATHS Number of Full Baths 
HBATHS Number of Half Baths 
SQFT Heated Square Feet 
SQFT2 SQFT Squared 
FIRE Number of Fireplaces 
LOTSIZE Lot Area 
Sty_15 1 Story 
STY_15 1.5 Story 
STY_2 2.0 Story 
STY_25 >= 2.5 STORY 
A_FRAME A-Frame 
BILEVEL Bi-Level 
CAPECOD Cape Cod 
RRANCH Ranch with Basement 
SPLIT LEVEL Split Level 
AD Air-Ducted Heat 
BASEBOARD Baseboard Heat 
HP Heat Pump 
HW Hot Water 
CELL_RD Radiant Ceiling 
STEAM Steam 
ELECTRIC Electric Heat 
GAS Gas Heat 
NONE No Heat Source 
OWC Oil/Wood/Coal Heat 
SOLAR Solar Heat - Passive 
CS Crawl Space 
ALUMVINYL Aluminum or Vinyl 
ASBSDGSHG Asbestos Siding or Shingles 
BOARDBATTE Board and Batten 
CEDARRDWD Redwood Cedar 
CEM_BRSPL Cement Brick/Special Blend 
COMPWALL Composite or Wallboard 
CONCBLOCK Concrete Block 
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Table 2, Continued 
LGT_CORR Corrugated Light Metal 
PLYWOOD Exterior Plywood 
FACEBRICK Brick 
HARDIPLK Hardiplank 
JUMBBRICK Jumbo/Composite Brick 
MASONITE Masonite 
SDGNONE Siding None/Minimal 
SIDINGNS Siding with no sheathing 
STONE Stone 
HRDSTUCC Hardcoat Stucco 
SYNSTUCC Synthetic Stucco 
STGWD Wood on Sheathing 
SHINGWD Wood Shingle 
AVERAGE Average Quality 
BELOW Below Average Quality 
CUSTOM Custom Built 
EXCELLENT Excellent Quality 
GOOD Good Quality 
VG Very Good Quality 
AC Air Conditioning  
Foreclosure Attributes 
LFORECLOSE Length of Time Foreclosed Property is Bank Owned 
PERFORE Percent of Singe Family Housing Units Foreclosed 
D330HU Percent of Foreclosed Housing Units within 330 Feet 
D660HU Percent of Foreclosed Housing Units between 331 and 660 Feet 
D990HU Percent of Foreclosed Housing Units between 661 and 990 Feet 
Neighborhood Attributes 
CITY Inside City of Charlotte Limits 
VIOLENT Violent Crime 
PROPERTY Property Crime 
JUVENILE Juvenile Arrest 
APPEARANCE Appearance Index 
SUBSTANDARD Substandard Housing 
N_OWNER Homeownership 
SIDEWALK Sidewalk Index 
INCOMECHG Income Change 
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Table 2, Continued 
FOODSTAMP Percent Food Stamp Recipients 
TRANSIT Access to Transit 
RETAIL Access to Retail 
NWHITE Percent of Non-White Students 
NSCHOOLS Percent Attending Neighborhood Schools 
Distance Attributes 
DMAJOR Distance to Major Thoroughfare 
DCBD Distance to CBD 
DCBD2 Distance to CBD Squared (Transformed Data) 
Temporal Variables 
Y2003_Q1 Sale Year 2003, Quarter 1 
Y2004_Q2 Sale Year 2003, Quarter 2 
Y2003_Q3 Sale Year 2003, Quarter 3 
Y2003_Q4 Sale Year 2003, Quarter 4 
Y2004_Q1 Sale Year 2004, Quarter 1 
Y2004_Q2 Sale Year 2004, Quarter 2 
Y2004_Q3 Sale Year 2004, Quarter 3 
Y2004_Q4 Sale Year 2004, Quarter 4 
Y2005_Q1 Sale Year 2005, Quarter 1 
Y2005_Q2 Sale Year 2005, Quarter 2 
Y2005_Q3 Sale Year 2005, Quarter 3 
Y2005_Q4 Sale Year 2005, Quarter 4 
Y2006_Q1 Sale Year 2006, Quarter 1 
Y2006_Q2 Sale Year 2006, Quarter 2 
Y2006_Q3 Sale Year 2006, Quarter 3 
Y2006_Q4 Sale Year 2006, Quarter 4 
Y2007_Q1 Sale Year 2007, Quarter 1 
Y2007_Q2 Sale Year 2007, Quarter 2 
Y2007_Q3 Sale Year 2007, Quarter 3 
Y2007_Q4 Sale Year 2007, Quarter 4 
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price and ownership information were recorded by the Register of Deeds. The sales price 
recorded was based on the contract sales price negotiated between the seller and the 
buyer.  
At the time of the sales transaction, the owner’s mailing address was collected. In 
addition, if the occupying owner had moved out of the housing unit and rented the 
property, the address was changed with the Mecklenburg County tax collector to reflect 
the current residence address. For this research, the property owner’s mailing address was 
compared to the physical address of the property to determine homeownership status. If 
the property address did not match, the record was coded as a rental. The analysis was 
conducted two or more years after the sales transaction to account for any change in the 
potential for investors buying property for investment purposes. 
The independent variables used to test the eight hypotheses were organized into 
five categories: structural, neighborhood, temporal, distance, and foreclosure groups. The 
structural variables were collected from the Mecklenburg County Property Ownership 
and Land Records Information System which merged the Mecklenburg County Tax 
Assessor with sale data from the Register of Deeds. The structural variables included the 
age of the residential building at the date of sale (AGE). AGE was also transformed by 
squaring and cubing the value to correct for the non-linearity of the variable. Additional 
structural variables included the number of bedrooms (BEDS), number of full bathrooms 
(FBATHS), half baths (HBATHS), the number of fireplaces (FIRE), and the area of the 
building lot (LOTSIZE). Heated square feet (SQFT) was also included and was squared 
to improve the linearity of the variable in the equations. These structural variables were 
expected to be positively correlated with both dependent variables except for AGE. An 
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additional 48 structural variables were included as dummies to control for important 
housing attributes, including siding, foundation, heating, air conditioning, and number of 
stories. 
The neighborhood attributes category relied on neighborhood conditions data 
contained in the Charlotte Neighborhood Quality of Life Study from 2002-2008. The 
individual housing sales data were linked to the closest study year moving forward. So 
that, home sales in 2003 were linked with the 2004 Quality of Life report, 2004 and 2005 
home sales were linked with the 2006 report and the 2006 and 2007 home sales were 
linked with the 2008 report. NSA scale economic, crime, physical, and social attributes 
were selected for the analyses.  
All crime data were provided by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. 
Three crime variables were selected. The violent crime rate (VIOLENT) encompassed 
homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults defined according to Uniform Crime 
Report (UCR) standards. The property crime rates (PROPERTY) included burglaries, 
larcenies, vehicle thefts, arson and vandalism incidences as defined according to UCR 
standards. VIOLENT and PROPERTY were calculated by dividing the number of crimes 
by the NSA population. The juvenile arrest rate (JUVENILE) was represented as the 
number of individuals arrested in an NSA under the age of 16. 
 The physical variables captured the appearance, housing quality, ownership, 
walkability and access to amenities for a NSA. Neighborhood appearance 
(APPEARANCE) was based on the number of code violations normalized by the number 
of parcels in an NSA. Housing code violations (SUBSTANDARD) were summarized by 
each NSA and divided by the number of residential units. Both APPEARANCE and 
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SUBSTANDARD were maintained by the City of Charlotte Neighborhood and Business 
Services. The overall homeownership of the NSA (N_OWNER) was summarized for all 
housing units including single family homes, condominiums, townhomes, and 
apartments.  
The Sidewalk index (SIDEWALK) measured the length of sidewalk compared to 
the total length of the streets in the NSA. The Charlotte Department of Transportation 
(CDOT) maintained this information and it was further updated using digital aerial 
photography for the portions of the study area in Mecklenburg County. The availability 
of transit (TRANSIT) was measured by the number of residential units situated within a 
¼ mile of a Charlotte Area Transit System bus stop. The availability of retail (RETAIL) 
was represented by the number of residential units within ¼ mile of a grocery store or 
pharmacy. 
The socio-economic characteristics of a neighborhood were represented by four 
variables. These included income change, food stamp recipients, school attendance 
preference, and ethnicity. Income change (INCOMECHG) measured the shift in median 
household income with data purchased from Claritas, a vendor that sells projected census 
data. The number of individuals receiving food stamps (FOODSTAMP) was provided by 
the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services and was divided by the 
population of the NSA. More detailed definitions and sources for thee eleven variables 
just discussed and used in the Quality of Life Report are provided in the Appendix A. 
Two additional socio-economic variables used in the study analyses were not 
derived from the Quality of Life Study. They were variables collected from Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools (CMS). The percentage of non-white students was coded by CMS 
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where races codes other than Caucasian were considered non-white (NWHITE). In 
addition, the percentage of students who attended neighborhood schools was calculated 
by CMS. Students were assigned a home school. If the home school matched the school 
attended, the student was classified as attending a neighborhood school (NSCHOOL).  
An additional physical variable (CITY) was collected to control for the 
annexation date of the property to the city of Charlotte. The variable was coded as 1 as 
being inside the city limits on the date of sale and 0 if not in the city limits.  
The distance attributes were calculated with ARCGIS 9.3 using the latitude and 
longitude coordinates of the market sale. The distance from the market sale to the center 
City of Charlotte (DCBD) was measured in straight line with the intersection of Trade 
and Tryon streets considered to be center city. The distance to a major thoroughfare 
(DMAJOR) was measured in feet between a market sale and the closest non-residential 
street as classified by CDOT. 
The temporal attributes included dummy variables for each quarter of market 
sales. Since there were four quarters in each of the five years, 20 dummy variables 
representing the quarter a market sale was included. 
Finally, the foreclosure data category was processed to create five variables. The 
foreclosed housing units were identified by trustee deed filed with the register of deeds. 
When a housing unit was foreclosed, a trustee deed instrument indicated the mortgage 
holder has taken ownership of the property.   
First, the percentage of single family detached units foreclosed (PERFORE) was 
calculated by dividing the number of foreclosed properties in a calendar year by the 
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number of single family units in each NSA.  The PERFORE value was then assigned to 
all market sales in the NSA for the corresponding year. 
 Second, the length of time a foreclosed property was bank owned was calculated 
based on the difference of two dates in the property transaction history. The first date was 
calculated based on the date the property was transferred from individual ownership to a 
financial institution as recorded by the Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds. This 
transaction record was usually coded as “TRUSTEE DEED”. However, errors in this 
coding were detected and further analysis was conducted to identify the ownership by 
financial institution to specifically determine the exact transaction date.  If the housing 
unit did not transfer to a financial institution and was sold to another individual owner, 
the number of days calculated was 0. The second date was calculated when the property 
transferred from the financial institution to an individual owner or investor. The 
difference between the two dates was calculated for each foreclosed property to 
determine the number of days the foreclosure property was bank owned. The average 
number of days for all foreclosed properties in a NSA for each calendar year was 
summarized (LFORECLOSURE). The variable LFORECLOSURE was assigned to all 
market sales in the NSA. 
 A third, fourth, and fifth variables were the proximity to foreclosure. These 
variables were calculated by measuring a ‘shadow distance’ around each market sale for 
every sales quarter, 2003-2007. The number of foreclosures at each level and sales 
quarter was summarized and normalized by the number of housing units. The distance 
rings were 0-330 feet (D330HU), 331-660 feet (D660HU), and 661-990 feet (D990HU).  
These choices of three distances were made because of widespread data variability for 
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areal units less than 1/8 mile (1320 feet). Appendix B describes other distances used to 
test the sensitivity of other distances.  
Figure 14 illustrates an example of how the variable was calculated. For analytical 
purposes, the author selected his house in the College Downs neighborhood (NSA 138) 
This single family home was purchased in 2007. 
 
Figure 14, Foreclosure Analysis 
Source: Author compiled from Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds 
 
 In this illustration, the house symbols indicate the actual market sale and the 
relevant foreclosures. The relevant foreclosures were divided by all the housing units (not 
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shown) to obtain the proportion of foreclosed units for each housing ring. The data were 
processed using ArcGIS 9.3 and SPSS. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
During the study period, 2003-2007, over 84,000 single family residential 
properties changed ownership in Charlotte, North Carolina. Of these, 72,061 were willing 
market transfers between buyers and sellers. These market sales were the basis for the 
number of records analyzed in the eight hypotheses.  There were 10,279 “foreclosures” 
used to calculate the foreclosure attributes in the hypotheses. The percent of foreclosures 
and length of foreclosures were calculated using the NSA geography combined with each 
of the 72,061 market sales. The foreclosure shadow zone variables were calculated based 
upon each individual market sale location and the concentration of foreclosures at three 
distance rings.  
As one might expect, the geographical pattern of foreclosures activity was not 
uniformly distributed across the community. As seen in Figure 15, the percentage of 
single family housing units foreclosed in 2007, showed a highest concentrations in the 
Northwest, North, and East portions of Charlotte. These geographical bands encompassed 
older, middle, ring neighborhoods as well as the newly developed suburban ‘vinyl 
village’ communities discussed earlier.  
The sharp geographical contrast, the “wedge of wealth” in southeast Charlotte 
displayed the lowest portions of foreclosure. In addition, gentrifying neighborhoods 
around the center city of Charlotte had lower foreclosure rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15, Percentage of Single Family Housing Units Foreclosed, 2007 
Source: Author compiled from Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds 
 
The geographical pattern of foreclosures mirrored the fundamental social 
geography of Charlotte. The intersection of traditional median household income, 
housing prices, and race/ethnicity was illustrated. In particular, neighborhoods in the 
Southeast have had higher median household income, higher housing prices, and mostly 
white. Whereas, the areas in the Northwest, North and the East have had lower median 
household incomes, lower housing values, and higher proportions of non-white 
populations. These patterns, while representing broad socio-economic zones of Charlotte, 
should not be interpreted as a cause and effect relationship suggesting that only lower 
income households living in lower priced housing experienced foreclosure. Simply, the 
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data showed that foreclosure was not evenly distributed across all classes and 
geographies in Charlotte. 
Figure 16 offers a time series perspective on foreclosure activity for the period 
from 2003-2007. It displays the percentage change within each neighborhood during the 
four year period. The citywide differences are stark. Some neighborhoods had drops in 
foreclosure or no foreclosure activity, while in other cases the rate of increase was over 
100 percent. 
 
Figure 16, Percentage Change in Single Family Housing Units Foreclosed, 2003-2007 
Source: Author compiled from Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds 
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The overall geographical pattern of foreclosure activity did not shift significantly. 
Foreclosure rates increased, but selected inner city neighborhoods and Southeast 
Charlotte were largely unaffected. The distribution of foreclosed units continued to be 
most heavily concentrated in the areas north of the city center and middle ring suburbs in 
East Charlotte.  
These geographical distributions of foreclosure change follow the traditional 
socio-economic geographies outlined previously. Indeed, The Charlotte Neighborhood 
Quality of Life data showed that during the study period, many neighborhoods in the 
Southeast enjoyed increases in income and housing prices. Whereas, the areas in the 
North and the East had shrinking median household incomes and flat or declining 
housing values. The modeling results presented later in this chapter offer insights on 
these descriptive data. 
Beyond the magnitude of the foreclosure in single family housing markets, the 
length of time that a property was bank owned after foreclosure was hypothesized to be a 
critical concern. Figure 17 shows the average length of time that a single family home 
was bank owned between 2003 to 2007. Again, these data were framed by NSA 
geography. In order to avoid potential interpretation error, NSAs with less than five 
foreclosures during the study period were excluded from the analysis.   
The spatial patterns of the time in foreclosure show that the longest periods of 
time, i.e. greater than 160 days, were highly clustered in suburban areas Northwest and 
Northeast of the center city in NSAs with large starter subdivision activity. Smaller 
pockets in East and Southeast quadrants of the city had longer periods of foreclosure. 
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These neighborhoods were ‘middle ring’ neighborhoods often undergoing redevelopment 
as large immigrant settlement destinations.  
 
Figure 17, Average Length of Foreclosure, 2003-2007 
Source: Author compiled from Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds 
 The descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis are presented in Table 3. In order to further analyze these data, they are broken 
out by single family housing submarkets – low valued, middle valued and upper valued 
in Table 4.  
A review of housing submarket data showed widespread evidence that housing 
price differential translates into significant differences beyond the size and features of the 
residential housing stock. Deep socio-economic gaps were displayed as average housing 
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Table 3: Overall Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
SALE_PRICE 211,074 146,858 
H_OWNER 0.83 0.38 
Structural Attributes 
AGE 17.12 21.04 
AGE2 735.56 1,424.64 
AGE3 40,648.95 108,537.84 
BEDS 3.28 0.72 
FBATHS 2.04 0.59 
HBATHS 0.59 0.51 
SQFT 2,093.38 827.10 
SQFT2 5,066,310.53 4,155,464.42 
FIRE 0.85 0.38 
LOTSIZE 12,777.90 9,214.87 
Sty_15 0.3352 0.4721 
STY_15 0.0564 0.2307 
STY_2 0.5629 0.4960 
STY_25 0.0159 0.1252 
A_FRAME 0.0000 0.0065 
BILEVEL 0.0037 0.0605 
CAPECOD 0.0007 0.0255 
RRANCH 0.0043 0.0658 
SPLIT LEVEL 0.0208 0.1428 
AD 0.9288 0.2572 
BASEBOARD 0.0061 0.0779 
HP 0.0444 0.2060 
HW 0.0005 0.0214 
CELL_RD 0.0001 0.0083 
STEAM 0.0001 0.0037 
ELECTRIC 0.0843 0.2778 
GAS 0.9067 0.2908 
NONE 0.0032 0.0567 
OWC 0.0057 0.0752 
SOLAR 0.0001 0.0083 
CS 0.4628 0.4986 
ALUMVINYL 0.5242 0.4994 
ASBSDGSHG 0.0074 0.0859 
BOARDBATTE 0.0003 0.0162 
CEDARRDWD 0.0061 0.0781 
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     Table 3, Continued 
CEM_BRSPL 0.0001 0.0099 
COMPWALL 0.0003 0.0167 
CONCBLOCK 0.0006 0.0250 
LGT_CORR 0.0001 0.0118 
PLYWOOD 0.0059 0.0767 
FACEBRICK 0.2260 0.4182 
HARDIPLK 0.0199 0.1397 
JUMBBRICK 0.0001 0.0099 
MASONITE 0.1321 0.3386 
SDGNONE 0.0000 0.0053 
SIDINGNS 0.0006 0.0241 
STONE 0.0002 0.0154 
HRDSTUCC 0.0098 0.0984 
SYNSTUCC 0.0012 0.0347 
STGWD 0.0613 0.2399 
SHINGWD 0.0037 0.0603 
Average 0.7966 0.4026 
Below 0.0055 0.0740 
Custom 0.0049 0.0699 
Excellent 0.0101 0.1001 
Good 0.1403 0.3473 
Vg 0.0426 0.2020 
Ac 0.9394 0.2385 
Foreclosure Attributes 
Lforeclose 124.48 64.72 
PerFore 0.0109 0.0089 
D330HU 0.0054 0.0248 
D660HU 0.0046 0.0143 
D990HU 0.0046 0.0121 
Neighborhood Attributes 
CITY 0.94 0.24 
VIOLENT 0.61 0.80 
PROPERTY 0.75 0.69 
JUVENILE 0.71 1.07 
APPEARANCE 0.07 0.10 
SUBSTANDARD 0.01 0.02 
N_OWNER 0.67 0.18 
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    Table 3, Continued 
SIDEWALK 0.43 0.27 
INCOMECHG 0.02 0.01 
FOODSTAMP 0.06 0.07 
TRANSIT 0.32 0.37 
RETAIL 0.12 0.14 
NWHITE 0.58 0.27 
NSCHOOLS 0.66 0.14 
Distance Attributes 
DMAJOR 846.56 671.04 
DCBD (miles) 8.13 3.30 
DCBD2 76.94 53.47 
Temporal Attributes  
Y2003_Q1 0.03 0.18 
Y2004_Q2 0.04 0.20 
Y2003_Q3 0.04 0.20 
Y2003_Q4 0.04 0.19 
Y2004_Q1 0.03 0.18 
Y2004_Q2 0.05 0.22 
Y2004_Q3 0.05 0.23 
Y2004_Q4 0.05 0.22 
Y2005_Q1 0.04 0.19 
Y2005_Q2 0.06 0.23 
Y2005_Q3 0.06 0.24 
Y2005_Q4 0.06 0.23 
Y2006_Q1 0.05 0.22 
Y2006_Q2 0.07 0.26 
Y2006_Q3 0.06 0.24 
Y2006_Q4 0.06 0.23 
Y2007_Q1 0.05 0.21 
Y2007_Q2 0.06 0.24 
Y2007_Q3 0.05 0.23 
Y2007_Q4 0.04 0.19 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Value Group 
  Less than $150,000 $150,000-$250,000 Greater than $250,000 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent 
Variables        
SALE_PRICE $124,846 $34,605 $210,332 $52,200 $461,557 $193,410
H_OWNER 0.76 0.43 0.87 0.33 0.90 0.30
Independent Variables 
Structural Attributes 
AGE 21 22 11 17 18 23
AGE2 939 1,513 411 1,041 858 1,728
AGE3 51,195 116,390 20,941 74,652 53,342 137,636
BEDS 2.97 0.51 3.40 0.67 3.93 0.83
FBATHS 1.78 0.44 2.08 0.37 2.74 0.75
HBATHS 0.44 0.50 0.73 0.46 0.73 0.51
SQFT 1,478 346 2,346 487 3,317 750
SQFT2 (000) 2,306 1,057 5,741 2,383 11,568 4,902
FIRE 0.71 0.46 0.97 0.20 1.01 0.24
LOTSIZE 11,485 7,642 12,000 8,736 18,219 12,026
STY_1 0.5507 0.4974 0.1605 0.3671 0.0952 0.2935
STY_15 0.0304 0.1716 0.0679 0.2515 0.1066 0.3086
STY_2 0.3787 0.4851 0.7425 0.4373 0.7018 0.4575
STY_25 0.0004 0.0187 0.0063 0.0792 0.0820 0.2744
A_FRAME 0.0001 0.0076 0.0000 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000
BILEVEL 0.0062 0.0788 0.0018 0.0421 0.0004 0.0205
CAPECOD 0.0013 0.0366 0.0000 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000
RRANCH 0.0039 0.0627 0.0035 0.0588 0.0074 0.0859
SPLIT LEVEL 0.0283 0.1658 0.0175 0.1311 0.0065 0.0804
AD 0.8916 0.3109 0.9637 0.1871 0.9597 0.1966
BASEBOARD 0.0118 0.1078 0.0011 0.0329 0.0008 0.0276
HP 0.0565 0.2309 0.0322 0.1764 0.0362 0.1869
HW 0.0003 0.0162 0.0003 0.0176 0.0014 0.0367
CELL_RD 0.0001 0.0108 0.0000 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000
STEAM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0092
ELECTRIC 0.1146 0.3185 0.0553 0.2287 0.0602 0.2379
GAS 0.8684 0.3380 0.9427 0.2324 0.9386 0.2401
NONE 0.0066 0.0810 0.0002 0.0124 0.0002 0.0130
OWC 0.0104 0.1012 0.0017 0.0412 0.0009 0.0305
SOLAR 0.0001 0.0076 0.0001 0.0088 0.0001 0.0092
CS 0.3936 0.4885 0.3533 0.4780 0.9028 0.2962
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Less than $150,000
$150,000 - 
$250,000 
Greater than 
$250,000 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
ALUMVINYL 0.4549 0.4980 0.6219 0.4849 0.5107 0.4999
ASBSDGSHG 0.0061 0.0781 0.0083 0.0907 0.0094 0.0963
BOARDBATTE 0.0003 0.0179 0.0002 0.0124 0.0003 0.0184
CEDARRDWD 0.0075 0.0861 0.0047 0.0687 0.0053 0.0727
CEM_BRSPL 0.0001 0.0076 0.0002 0.0124 0.0001 0.0092
COMPWALL 0.0003 0.0171 0.0003 0.0176 0.0002 0.0130
CONCBLOCK 0.0007 0.0259 0.0006 0.0248 0.0005 0.0225
LGT_CORR 0.0002 0.0132 0.0002 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000
PLYWOOD 0.0056 0.0745 0.0057 0.0753 0.0073 0.0854
FACEBRICK 0.2745 0.4463 0.1671 0.3730 0.2146 0.4105
HARDIPLK 0.0185 0.1349 0.0229 0.1496 0.0173 0.1304
JUMBBRICK 0.0001 0.0076 0.0001 0.0108 0.0002 0.0130
MASONITE 0.1410 0.3480 0.1067 0.3088 0.1621 0.3685
SDGNONE 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0092
SIDINGNS 0.0006 0.0248 0.0006 0.0248 0.0004 0.0205
STONE 0.0002 0.0143 0.0002 0.0139 0.0004 0.0205
HRDSTUCC 0.0139 0.1170 0.0062 0.0785 0.0058 0.0761
SYNSTUCC 0.0017 0.0411 0.0007 0.0263 0.0009 0.0305
STGWD 0.0701 0.2553 0.0499 0.2177 0.0610 0.2394
SHINGWD 0.0038 0.0615 0.0036 0.0598 0.0034 0.0580
AVERAGE 0.9851 0.1211 0.8691 0.3373 0.0927 0.2901
BELOW 0.0112 0.1053 0.0003 0.0186 0.0003 0.0184
CUSTOM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0299 0.1703
EXCELLENT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0616 0.2405
GOOD 0.0036 0.0598 0.1269 0.3329 0.5645 0.4959
VG 0.0001 0.0094 0.0036 0.0597 0.2510 0.4336
AC 0.8843 0.3199 0.9893 0.1031 0.9887 0.1058
Foreclosure Variables 
LFORECLOSURE 140.37 54.63 120.94 64.47 86.35 74.36
PERFORE 0.0153 0.0090 0.0086 0.0071 0.0034 0.0037
D330HU 0.0086 0.0287 0.0030 0.0198 0.0018 0.0211
D660HU 0.0072 0.0170 0.0028 0.0104 0.0012 0.0117
D990HU 0.0072 0.0145 0.0029 0.0096 0.0011 0.0069
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Table 4, Continued 
 
Less than $150,000
$150,000 - 
$250,000 
Greater than 
$250,000 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Neighborhood Attributes 
CITY 0.94 0.24 0.92 0.27 0.95 0.21
VIOLENT 0.97 0.96 0.31 0.42 0.24 0.34
PROPERTY 1.00 0.80 0.53 0.46 0.52 0.48
JUVENILE 1.02 1.22 0.45 0.84 0.35 0.78
APPEARANCE 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03
SUBSTANDARD 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
N_OWNER 0.62 0.20 0.73 0.15 0.70 0.15
SIDEWALK 0.39 0.23 0.43 0.26 0.53 0.35
INCOMECHG 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
FOODSTAMP 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
TRANSIT 0.43 0.38 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.38
RETAIL 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.16
NWHITE 0.73 0.20 0.50 0.23 0.28 0.19
NSCHOOLS 0.60 0.11 0.70 0.13 0.76 0.14
Distance Attributes 
DMAJOR (feet) 810.11 615.26 870.09 686.27 900.39 777.49
DCBD (miles) 6.86 2.81 9.36 2.90 9.10 4.00
DCBD2 (miles) 54.91 40.40 96.02 50.15 98.78 66.78
Temporal Attributes 
Y2003_Q1 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17
Y2004_Q2 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21
Y2003_Q3 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.21
Y2003_Q4 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Y2004_Q1 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Y2004_Q2 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.25
Y2004_Q3 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24
Y2004_Q4 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21
Y2005_Q1 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Y2005_Q2 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Y2005_Q3 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Y2005_Q4 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22
Y2006_Q1 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20
Y2006_Q2 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26
Y2006_Q3 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Y2006_Q4 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Y2007_Q1 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21
Y2007_Q2 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Y2007_Q3 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23
Y2007_Q4 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
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prices increase. The most critical differentiation was that submarket characteristics were 
linked to residential foreclosure. Simply stated, foreclosure was far more characteristic 
among lower income home owners and least prevalent among upper-income 
householders. Figure 18 shows a tabular distribution of foreclosure across time and the 
three housing submarkets. Temporally, after an approximately 20 percent increase in 
foreclosure in the lowest priced housing market between 2003 and 2004, the rate of 
foreclosure remained stable through 2007. Because the other two categories, $150,000-
$250,000 and greater than $250,000 were much smaller, their foreclosure numbers 
fluctuated up and down in the 10 percent range. 
 
Figure 18, Foreclosures by Assessed Value 
Source: Author compiled from Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds 
 
 When the descriptive data were combined,  a highly segmented picture of 
foreclosure activity was revealed. Single family homes, with assessed values less than 
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$150,000 targeted at low-income household owners, displayed the highest rates of 
mortgage foreclosure, 1.5 percent. They experienced the longest average length of time in 
foreclosure, at slightly more than 140 days, the time between the bank takes possession of 
the house to when it sells the property to a non-financial institution. And, they were the 
most concentrated, as reflected by the shadow zones, around market sales in the same 
assessment category. Within the 330 feet shadow zone, the concentration of foreclosures 
was 0.9 percent, while within 331-660 feet, and 661-990 feet of a market sale, the 
concentration was 0.7 percent. 
 Single family homes with assessed values between $150,000 and $250,000 were 
marketed to middle-income household owners. This housing segment displayed an 
average rate of mortgage foreclosure, 0.86 percent. They experienced an average length 
of time in foreclosure, at slightly more than 121 days. And, they were geographically 
more evenly distributed, as reflected by the shadow zone around market sales in the same 
assessment range. Within all three distance rings, the concentration of foreclosures was 
0.3 percent. 
 Finally, single family homes with assessed values greater than $250,000, were 
expected to be occupied by upper-income households owners. This grouping displayed 
the lowest average rates of mortgage foreclosure, 0.34 percent. They experienced an 
average length of time in foreclosure, at slight less than 86 days. They were unevenly 
distributed, within the shadow zones around market sales in the same assessed value 
range. Within 330 feet of a market sale, the concentration of foreclosures was 0.2 percent, 
while within 331-600 and 661-990 distance rings, the concentration was 0.1 percent. 
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 The primary focuses of this research was to statistically measure and examine the 
strength of the relationship between foreclosure activity and surrounding market sale 
residential properties. Broadly stated, within this framework, the study posited that the 
scale and intensity of single-family housing foreclosure would adversely affect 
surrounding market sale properties. Based upon a review of the existing research 
literature and my own empirical work in community development and planning, four 
hypotheses were developed and testes, in order to examine these housing related issues. 
Hypothesis 1 
 As stated, hypothesis 1 was that as the proportion of foreclosed homes in a 
residential community increased, the market sale prices of other homes in the community 
would be negatively impacted. As seen Table 5, the hypothesis was supported by the 
multiple regression analysis. The adjusted R2 was 0.855 and the standardized beta 
coefficient was -0.066. These results can be interpreted to report that the model was able 
to account for over 85 percent of the variation in housing sale prices. The direction of the 
relationship was negative. In other words, as the proportion of foreclosures increased, 
housing sales prices were lower. 
 In order to better understand the structural impact of foreclosure across the 
Charlotte housing market, the full model was deconstructed to examine the relationship 
across the three real estate submarkets. Thus, the multiple regression analysis was carried 
out in low valued, middle valued, and upper valued housing submarkets. 
 The results, presented in Table 5, show that the three sub-models were statistically 
significant. However, there were notable differences across the sub-models. First, the 
explanatory power of the model varied as housing values changed, with the strongest 
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predictive power among the lowest valued homes. The R2 was 0.615. The highest values 
home explained slightly less variation with an R2 at 0.590 and those in the middle price 
range at 0.537. 
 More critically, the direction of the relationship was different for the upper valued 
housing submarkets. Among the lowest and middle valued homes, the beta coefficients 
were negative and mirrored the operation of the full model. Again, these findings were 
that increased foreclosures translated into lower home values. But, in the most expensive 
home markets, increased foreclosures were linked to increases in home sales prices. One 
potential explanation for the counterintuitive findings may relate to the scale of NSA 
geography and the location of “high end” foreclosures. Spatially, the upper income 
housing market is concentrated in Southeast Charlotte and in suburban districts. These 
real estate markets were experiencing the highest rate of real estate appreciation. When 
combined with the relatively low number of foreclosures in homes valued at over 
$250,000, i.e. less than 200 homes each year during the study period, the negative impact 
was submerged by the larger number of market sales in the high wealth neighborhoods.  
 While these research findings were case study specific, they offered scientific 
evidence confirming the differential impact of foreclosures on housing prices linked to 
the increased mortgage defaults in low income communities. In turn, the differing 
foreclosure experiences between low wealth and high wealth communities during this 
time created another challenge for struggling neighborhoods both inner city and 
suburban. 
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Hypothesis 2A 
 As stated, hypothesis 2 was that the market sale price of a residential property was 
adversely impacted by the close proximity to existing foreclosed housing units. The 
findings of the multiple regression analysis support the hypothesis. See Table 6. The 
adjusted R2 was 0.854. As with Hypothesis 1, the model was able to account for over 85 
percent of the variation in housing sales prices. As expected, the concentration of 
foreclosures in the closest distance ring, 0-330 feet, showed the strongest negative 
relationship. The standardized beta coefficient was -0.021. In the next zone, 331-660 feet 
distance ring, the relationship was weaker, with a standardized beta coefficient of -0.010. 
But, unexpectedly, in the 661-990 feet distance ring, the relationship strengthened with 
the concentration of foreclosures with a standardized beta coefficient of -0.017.  
The direction of all the shadow zone relationships with the concentration of 
foreclosures in each distance ring was negative. In other words, as the concentration of 
foreclosures increased in each distance ring, the housing sale price was lower.  
Considering the differentiated proportion of foreclosures at the neighborhood 
level, the strengthening of the standardized beta coefficient suggested a potential 
relationship between foreclosure proximity and housing price in Charlotte’s housing 
submarkets. In order to examine this relationship, separate multiple regression analyses 
were conducted for the three market segments, low valued, middle valued, and upper 
valued housing submarkets. 
 These results are presented in Table 6.  A review of these findings show that the 
correlation between the proximity of foreclosure to low valued, middle valued and upper 
valued submarkets had a similar relationship to the overall dataset. However, the adjusted 
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R2 was lower for all three value groups. These findings were statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level. Low valued housing properties showed the strongest relationship. 
The adjusted R square was 0.614. Upper valued housing ranked second with an adjusted 
R square of 0.59. Finally, the middle valued housing properties presented an adjusted R 
square of 0.525.  
The relationship at the three distance rings was varied across the submarkets. But, 
the standardized beta coefficients were all negative and generally mirrored the operation 
of the full model. Reflecting theoretic and empirical literature, closest proximity to 
foreclosure translated into lower market sales. Moreover, the negative relationship with 
foreclosures weakened as the distance increased to between 331-660 feet. The negative 
relationship with the concentration of foreclosures then strengthened as the distanced 
increased from 661-900 feet.  
The strongest relationship was found for the lowest valued housing (< $150,000) 
and concentrations of foreclosures within 330 feet. The standardized beta coefficient was 
-0.046. The analysis results for housing valued between $150,000 and $250,000 was less 
clear-cut. Indeed, the most separated distance ring 661-990 feet had the strongest 
standardized beta coefficient -0.043. The results suggest that the proximity of foreclosure 
concentration to market sales in this group have a different pattern than the low valued 
housing properties. Perhaps, the middle income housing market is more robust and 
impacted by factors or neighborhood conditions that override the stigma or effect of 
concentrated foreclosures. 
For housing greater than $250,000, the strongest negative relationship occurred at 
closest distance ring, 0-330 feet. The relationship of foreclosure concentration was 
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positive at the second distance ring, 331-660 feet, and shifted to negative in the third 
distance ring, 661-990 feet. The second and third distance rings were not statistically 
significant. These findings suggest the impact of the proximity of foreclosure 
concentration in this highest valued housing submarket was much localized. In addition, 
the location of “high end” foreclosures in portions of Charlotte that were experiencing the 
highest rate of real estate appreciation may also have mitigated the impact of foreclosure 
concentration considering that less than 200 Charlotte homes valued over $250,000 were 
foreclosed. Consequently, the adverse impact was submerged by the larger number of 
market sales in high wealth neighborhoods. 
While limited to a single case study, these analyses offered evidence of magnified 
foreclosure nuisance effects on lower valued housing. The data also suggested that in all 
housing value groups distance mattered in affecting market sale pricing. 
Hypothesis 2B 
Research hypothesis 2 was that the market sale price of a residential property was 
adversely impacted by the close proximity to existing foreclosed housing units. 
Hypothesis 2B was an additional analysis conducted to compare different foreclosure 
rates within the housing valued less than $150,000.  The housing submarket was targeted 
for further analysis owing to the large number and proportion of foreclosures. Indeed, it 
was far higher than the other housing submarkets. For this analysis, neighborhoods with 
less than 1.5 percent of housing units foreclosed were compared to neighborhoods with 
more than 1.5 percent of housing units foreclosed. The choice of 1.5 percent equals to 0.5 
standard deviation above the average percent of foreclosed housing units at the 
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neighborhood level. Both groups were approximately the same size, roughly between 
16,500 and 17,400 housing units. 
As seen in Table 7, the hypothesis for both categories of low-income 
neighborhoods was supported by the multiple regression analysis. The adjusted R2 was 
0.744 for neighborhood with less than 1.5 percent of foreclosed single family homes and 
0.844 for neighborhood greater than 1.5 percent.  It is noteworthy that neighborhoods 
with higher rates of foreclosure displayed a significantly stronger relationship between 
proximity and affected sales price.  
In both groups, the shadow affect of concentrated foreclosure followed research 
expectations and were statistically significant. In every case, the direction of the 
standardized beta coefficient was negative. In other words, as the concentration of 
foreclosed property increased in each distance ring, the housing sale prices were lower. 
In neighborhoods with less than 1.5 percent of foreclosures, the strongest standardized 
beta coefficients was -0.057 for foreclosure concentrations in the closest distance ring, 0-
330 feet. The standardized beta coefficients weakened to -0.034 in the middle distance 
ring and dropped to -0.029 in the outer most distance ring. Unlike the analysis for all 
housing under $150,000, the standardized beta coefficient in the furthest ring was the 
weakest.  
In neighborhoods with greater than 1.5 percent foreclosed housing units, the 
strongest standardized beta coefficients was -0.043 for foreclosure concentrations in the 
closest distance ring. The second distance ring displayed a weaker standardized beta 
coefficient of -0.015, but the value strengthened slightly to -0.021 for the outer most 
distance ring.  
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Table 7: Multiple Regression Results for Hypothesis #2, 
Assessed Value Less than $150,000 
Neighborhood 
Foreclosures Less 
than 1.5% 
Neighborhood 
Foreclosures Greater  
than 1.5% 
B Z-Beta B Z-Beta 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Constant 11.832**  10.656**   
  (0.037) (0.043)
% Foreclosed 
Units 0-330ft 
-0.919** -0.057 -0.382** -0.043 
(0.083) (0.041)
% Foreclosed 
Units 331-
660ft 
-0.851** -0.034 -0.229** -0.015 
(-0.131) (0.073)
% Foreclosed 
Units 661-
990ft 
-0.808** -0.029 -0.393** -0.021 
(0.144) (0.088)
Structural 
Attributes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood 
Attributes Yes Yes 
Distance 
Attributes Yes Yes 
Year and 
Quarter 
Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 17,357 16,458 
Adjusted R2 0.744** 0.822** 
* P < 0.05, **P< 0.01.  
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Taken together, these results suggested that market sales in neighborhood with 
less than 1.5 percent of foreclosed housing units were more sensitive to the proximity of 
foreclosed housing units than those in neighborhoods with the proportion of foreclosed 
homes greater than 1.5 percent. The data suggested that a higher concentration of 
foreclosed housing units at the neighborhood level makes it more difficult to measure the 
impact of the proximity of foreclosures on housing prices.  
Since the group with higher foreclosure rates had a larger adjusted R square, the 
data suggested markets sale characteristics in high foreclosure neighborhoods varied less 
than market sales in low foreclosure neighborhoods.  A further review of the  descriptive 
statistics showed that higher foreclosure neighborhoods were newer leaving less time for 
the neighborhoods to make significant changes to the housing stock and repeat more 
uniform development patterns. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 focused upon the temporal impact of mortgage foreclosed 
residential properties in a neighborhood. It posited that the longer the average foreclosed 
home was for sale, the more severe the negative price impact upon neighborhood 
residential units. As seen in Table 8, the hypothesis was supported by the multiple 
regression analysis. The adjusted R2 for all properties was 0.854.  The standardized beta 
coefficient was -0.042, indicating the direction of the relationship was negative. In other 
words, as the length of foreclosure increased, housing sale prices were lower. 
In order to better understand the impact of the length of foreclosure or how long a 
banking institution owned a residential property, the full model was deconstructed to 
examine the relationship across the three real estate assessment submarkets. Thus, the 
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multiple regression analysis was carried out in for the low valued, middle valued, and 
upper valued housing submarkets.  
The results for the three sub-models were all statistically significant. But, there 
were significant differences between the housing submarkets. First, the explanatory 
power of the model varied as housing values increased, with the strongest predictive 
power among the lowest valued homes. The adjusted R2 was 0.615 in this submarket. The 
next most powerful model, the adjusted R2 equals 0.593 occurred at the highest valued 
homes. The adjusted R2 was 0.528. 
Secondly, the direction of the relationship differed between groups.  Among the 
lowest and middle valued homes, the beta coefficients were negative and mirrored the 
operation of the full model. The data suggested that increased length of foreclosure 
translated into lower home values. But, in the most expensive home markets, increased 
length of foreclosure was linked to higher home sales prices.  
As in the earlier research results surrounding high income housing markets, these 
counterintuitive findings may relate to the NSA scale geography and the concentration of 
“high end” foreclosures in parts of the city that were experiencing the highest rate of real 
estate appreciation. So that, given the relatively low number of foreclosures in homes 
valued at over $250,000, i.e. less than 200 homes each year during the study period, the 
negative impact was submerged by the larger number of market sales in the high wealth 
neighborhoods. 
While these findings were limited to this single case study, they indicated that 
along with the percent of foreclosed homes, the length of foreclosed homes has a 
differential impact across the housing submarkets. Specifically, these results found low 
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valued housing owners were more impacted by increased length of time that a foreclosed 
property was owned by banking institution. 
Hypothesis 4 
Research hypothesis 4 posited that market sales prices for residential properties 
were influenced by the structural attributes of the unit, neighborhood quality of life 
characteristics as well as, temporal and locational elements.  Table 9, presents the 
findings of the regression analysis. The hypotheses surrounding all four categories were 
supported. Following the earlier research framework, the regression analysis was carried 
using residential foreclosures and also applied to the three housing markets. The full 
model had an adjusted R square of 0.854, accounting for 85 percent of the variation in 
housing sale prices in the neighborhood. The submarket modeling was statistically 
significant but less reliable models. The strongest explanation was observed in the lowest 
price housing market, adjusted R square equals 0.614, and high income housing market, 
adjusted R square equals 0.590. The middle income housing market slipped to an 
adjusted R square equals 0.525. 
Among the independent variables categories, the structural attributes performed in 
the expected direction in the full model. The AGE variable operated in a negative 
direction with sales price. The beta coefficient was -0.012. This finding suggested that as 
the housing unit increased in age there was a lower housing sales price. The result makes 
sense since older housing diminished in value due to increased maintenance, replacement 
costs, and overall obsolescence of older housing. 
Conversely, the variables BEDS, FBATHS, HBATHS, SQFT, FIRE, and 
LOTSIZE displayed positive beta coefficients with housing price. In other words as the 
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Table 9: Multiple Regression Results for Hypothesis #4 
All Single 
Family 
Assessed 
Value Less 
than 
$150,000 
Assessed 
Value 
$150,000-
$250,000 
Assessed 
Value Greater 
than $250,000
B B B B 
(Std. 
Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Constant 11.665** 11.320** 12.029** 12.905**
  (0.018) (0.028) (0.036) (0.084)
Structural Attributes 
AGE 
-0.012** -0.012** -0.007** -0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
AGE2 
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
AGE3 
-0.000**
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
BEDS 
0.005**
(0.001)
0.016**
(0.002)
0.011**
(0.001)
-0.008*
(0.003)
FBATHS 
0.044**
(0.002)
0.059**
(0.004)
0.018**
(0.003)
0.031**
(0.004)
HBATHS 
0.017**
(0.002)
0.021**
(0.003)
-0.011**
(0.003)
0.026**
(0.006)
SQFT (000s) 
0.456**
(0.001)
0.894**
(0.023)
0.214**
(0.000)
0.028**
(0.023)
SQFT2 
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
FIRE 
 0.059*
(0.003)
0.049**
(0.003)
0.078**
(0.005)
-0.044**
(0.010)
LOTSIZE (000s) 
0.004**
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.017)
0.004**
(0.002)
STY_1 0.024**
(0.003)
Reference 0.023**
(0.005)
-0.018
(0.010)
STY_15 0.056**
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.007)
0.050**
(0.005)
0.033**
(0.008)
STY_2 Reference -0.038**
(0.004)
Reference Reference
STY_25 0.004
(0.007)
-0.043
(0.057)
0.075**
(0.014)
-0.015
(0.009)
A_FRAME -0.142
(0.122)
-0.137
(0.140)
-0.167
(0.169)
N/A
BILEVEL -0.092**
(0.013)
-0.069**
(0.014)
-0.135**
(0.025)
-0.081
(0.114)
CAPECOD -0.005
(0.031)
-0.024
(0.029)
-0.551**
(0.171)
N/A
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RRANCH -0.017
(0.012)
0.046**
(0.017)
-0.017
(0.018)
-0.0890**
(0.028)
SPLIT LEVEL -0.033**
(0.006)
-0.017*
(0.007)
-0.077**
(0.009)
-0.093**
(0.030)
AD 0.037*
(0.019)
0.109**
(0.024)
-0.046
(0.030)
-0.131
(0.082)
BASEBOARD 0.117**
(0.013)
0.096**
(0.013)
0.090**
(0.040)
-0.148
(0.105)
HP 0.121**
(0.009)
0.104**
(0.010)
0.055**
(0.024)
-0.081
(0.064)
HW 0.180**
(0.037)
0.145*
(0.066)
-0.081
(0.065)
-0.096
(0.088)
CELL_RD 0.103
(0.094)
0.117
(0.099)
-0.037
(0.170)
N/A
STEAM 0.437
(0.236)
N/A N/A N/A
ELECTRIC -0.023**
(0.004)
-0.010*
(0.005)
-0.062**
(0.007)
-0.049**
(0.016)
GAS Reference Reference Reference Reference
NONE -0.102**
(0.023)
-0.033
(0.027)
0.668
(0.098)
0.0621**
(0.198)
OWC -0.070**
(0.011)
-0.046**
(0.011)
-0.087**
(0.027)
0.026
(0.078)
SOLAR 0.072
(0.106)
0.204
(0.142)
0.076
(0.199)
0.178
(0.261)
CS 0.053**
(0.003)
0.007
(0.004)
0.084**
(0.003)
0.083**
(0.010)
ALUMVINYL Reference Reference Reference -0.146**
(0.009)
ASBSDGSHG -0.046**
(0.010)
-0.036**
(0.010)
0.051
(0.030)
-0.070
(0.069)
BOARDBATTE 0.087
(0.049)
-0.325*
(0.140)
0.120
(0.076)
0.001
(0.074)
CEDARRDWD 0.157**
(0.011)
0.074
(0.046)
0.119**
(0.016)
0.042**
(0.015)
CEM_BRSPL 0.055
(0.080)
N/A 0.081
(0.169)
-0.400
(0.254)
COMPWALL -0.287**
(0.047)
-0.272**
(0.046)
-0.144
(0.169)
N/A
CONCBLOCK 0.007
(0.032)
-0.133**
(0.034)
0.061
(0.076)
0.148
(0.131)
LGT_CORR 0.043
(0.070)
0.026
(0.075)
0.097
(0.120)
N/A
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PLYWOOD -0.018
(0.011)
-0.018
(0.011)
0.050
(0.029)
-0.016
(0.127)
FACEBRICK 0.093**
(0.003)
0.052**
(0.005)
0.103**
(0.005)
Reference
HARDIPLK 0.025**
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.018)
0.087**
(0.009)
-0.099**
(0.011)
JUMBBRICK 0.050
(0.080)
0.063
(0.075)
N/A N/A
MASONITE 0.030**
(0.003)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.045**
(0.004)
-0.051**
(0.009)
SDGNONE -0.041
(0.149)
0.122
(0.197)
N/A -0.194
(0.253)
SIDINGNS -0.023
(0.033)
-0.013
(0.033)
0.056
(0.098)
-0.211
(0.253)
STONE 0.030
(0.051)
0.253**
(0.066)
0.179
(0.085)
-0.636**
(0.127)
HRDSTUCC 0.179**
(0.009)
-0.048
(0.034)
0.150**
(0.027)
0.057**
(0.011)
SYNSTUCC 0.083**
(0.023)
0.067
(0.114)
N/A -0.0562
(0.028)
STGWD 0.022**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
0.057**
(0.007)
-0.050**
(0.013)
SHINGWD 0.144**
(0.014)
0.042
(0.042)
0.079**
(0.024)
0.038
(0.020)
AVERAGE Reference Reference Reference -0.047**
(0.009)
BELOW -0.154**
(0.011)
-0.158**
(0.011)
0.771**
(0.061)
0.185
(0.136)
CUSTOM 0.644**
(0.012)
N/A N/A 0.507**
(0.015)
EXCELLENT 0.443**
(0.009)
N/A N/A 0.306**
(0.011)
GOOD 0.158**
(0.003)
0.174**
(0.019)
0.096**
(0.004)
Reference
VG 0.317**
(0.005)
-0.054
(0.141)
0.064**
(0.020)
0.164**
(0.006)
AC 0.078**
(0.005)
0.055**
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.012)
0.017
(0.024)
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Neighborhood Attributes 
CITY 
0.018**
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.005)
0.055**
(0.004)
0.073**
(0.014)
VIOLENT 
-0.040**
(0.003)
-0.027**
(0.002)
-0.011
(0.006)
-0.042**
(0.018)
PROPERTY 
0.034**
(0.002)
0.030**
(0.002)
0.036**
(0.005)
-0.084**
(0.013)
JUVENILE 
-0.009**
(0.001)
-0.008**
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.013**
(0.004)
APPEARANCE 
-0.544**
(0.015)
-0.318**
(0.0156)
-0.732**
(0.032)
-1.086**
(0.1137)
SUBSTANDARD 
-1.114**
(0.070)
-1.148**
(0.070)
-3.565**
(0.261)
-3.913**
(1.039)
N_OWNER 
-0.087**
(0.008)
-0.091**
(0.010)
-0.069**
(0.011)
-0.124**
(0.027)
SIDEWALK 
0.093**
(0.004)
0.116**
(0.007)
0.011
(0.006)
0.081**
(0.012)
INCOMECHG 
1.261**
(0.095)
1.814**
(0.143)
0.391**
(0.138)
1.158**
(0.246)
FOODSTAMP 
-0.905**
(0.029)
-0.897**
(0.031)
-0.542**
(0.064)
-0.714**
(0.243)
TRANSIT 
0.084**
(0.005)
0.046**
(0.006)
0.111**
(0.008)
0.118**
(0.012)
RETAIL 
0.121**
(0.008)
0.118**
(0.010)
0.052**
(0.012)
0.038
(0.023)
NWHITE 
-0.444**
(0.006)
-0.394**
(0.009)
-0.276**
(0.009)
-0.104**
(0.025)
NSCHOOLS 
-0.031**
(0.010)
-0.186**
(0.015)
-0.016
(0.0138)
0.352**
(0.030)
Distance Attributes 
DMAJOR (00s) 
0.001**
(0.001)
0.009**
(0.002)
0.009** 
(0.002) 
0.039**
(0.004)
DCBD (miles) 
-0.014**
(0.000)
-0.012**
(0.000)
-0.015** 
(0.000) 
-0.019**
(0.001)
DCBD2 (miles) 
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000**
(0.000)
Temporal Attributes 
Y2003_Q1 -0.205**
(0.006)
-0.171**
(0.007)
-0.215** 
(0.008) 
-0.240**
(0.017)
Y2003_Q2 -0.202**
(0.005)
-0.170**
(0.007)
-0.211** 
(0.007) 
-0.203**
(0.015)
Y2003_Q3 -0.193**
(0.005)
-0.177**
(0.007)
-0.197** 
(0.007) 
-0.186**
(0.015)
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Y2003_Q4 -0.200**
(0.005)
-0.168**
(0.007)
-0.195** 
(0.007) 
-0.236**
(0.016)
Y2004_Q1 -0.154**
(0.005)
-0.133**
(0.007)
-0.162** 
(0.007) 
-0.185**
(0.016)
Y2004_Q2 -0.132**
(0.005)
-0.119**
(0.007)
-0.137** 
(0.006) 
-0.155**
(0.013)
Y2004_Q3 -0.118**
(0.004)
-0.101**
(0.006)
-0.136** 
(0.006) 
-0.140**
(0.013)
Y2004_Q4 -0.118**
(0.005)
-0.101**
(0.006)
-0.125** 
(0.006) 
-0.142**
(0.014)
Y2005_Q1 -0.098**
(0.005)
-0.086**
(0.007)
-0.111** 
(0.007) 
-0.111**
(0.016)
Y2005_Q2 -0.075**
(0.004)
-0.067**
(0.006)
-0.084** 
(0.006) 
-0.074**
(0.013)
Y2005_Q3 -0.065**
(0.004)
-0.059**
(0.006)
-0.076** 
(0.006) 
-0.052**
(0.013)
Y2005_Q4 -0.060**
(0.004)
-0.062**
(0.006)
-0.059** 
(0.006) 
-0.041**
(0.014)
Y2006_Q1 -0.034**
(0.005)
-0.025**
(0.006)
-0.028** 
(0.006) 
-0.068**
(0.014)
Y2006_Q2 Reference 
Y2006_Q3 0.017**
(0.005)
0.005**
(0.006)
0.028** 
(0.006) 
0.019
(0.014)
Y2006_Q4 0.027**
(0.005)
0.011**
(0.006)
0.038** 
(0.006) 
0.040**
(0.014)
Y2007_Q1 0.091**
(0.005)
0.095**
(0.007)
0.082** 
(0.007) 
0.063**
(0.015)
Y2007_Q2 0.124**
(0.005)
0.125**
(0.006)
0.106** 
(0.006) 
0.106**
(0.014)
Y2007_Q3 0.124**
(0.005)
0.127**
(0.007)
0.104** 
(0.006) 
0.104**
(0.014)
Y2007_Q4 0.112**
(0.005)
0.124**
(0.007)
0.088** 
(0.007) 
0.084**
(0.016)
Foreclosure Attributes 
D330HU 
-0.480**
(0.033)
-0.513**
(0.039)
-0.379** 
(0.054) 
-0.254*
(0.120)
D660HU 
-0.386**
(0.059)
-0.367**
(0.067)
-0.685** 
(0.104) 
0.185
(0.215)
D990HU 
-0.767**
(0.069)
-0.561**
(0.079)
-1.104** 
(0.114) 
-0.448
(0.338)
Observations 72,061 34,251  25,960 11,850 
Adjusted R2 0.854** 0.614** 0.525** 0.590** 
* P < 0.05, **P< 0.01.  
Source: Author 
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variables increased, the price of housing was higher. All were statistically significant. 
These results made economic sense as most consumers are willing to pay more for 
housing as the number of beds, bathrooms, square footage and lot size grow. 
The model also included an additional 48 structural variables to control for the 
variability in the model. These variables included siding, foundation type, structure 
quality, number of stories, heating type, air conditioning type.  
The analytical findings with the neighborhood variables did not always match the 
expected relationship. In the case of VIOLENT, JUVENILE, APPEARANCE, 
SUBSTANDARD, FOODSTAMP, NWHITE the beta coefficients were negatively 
related with sales price. The relationship suggested that as these variables increased at the 
neighborhood level, the price of individual housing units was lower. These results 
affirmed the literature showing that housing in neighborhoods with higher rates of crime 
and increased appearance and housing code violations were priced lower than 
comparable housing in other neighborhoods.  
Similarly, the variable SIDEWALK, INCOMECHG, and RETAIL, presented a 
positive relationship with sales price. Thus, as these variables increased, the price of 
housing was higher. In the case of these results, the analysis may represent the trend 
toward more compact neighborhood development and a willingness of homeowners to 
pay more for housing in neighborhoods with increased sidewalk access and walkable 
access to retail shopping. 
The remaining variables did not, however, perform as expected. The Variables 
CITY, PROPERTY, and TRANSIT, were expected to have a negative relationship with 
sales price. However, they showed a positive relationship. Since housing units outside the 
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city of Charlotte limits have lower taxes, their housing prices were expected to be higher 
outside the city limits. While property crime is expected to have a negative relationship 
with housing price, property crime could be higher with increasing opportunities in 
higher valued housing areas. Access to transit was expected to be negative since the data 
only incorporated bus stop information which is usually associated with lower valued 
housing. Restating the relationship, as property crime and transit access increased, the 
price of housing was higher. For the entire dataset, housing prices in the city increased 
faster than housing units outside the city limits.  
The N_OWNER and NSCHOOLS variables were expected to show a positive 
relationship with housing sales price. Neighborhoods with higher proportions of owner 
occupied housing and students attending neighborhood schools, exhibited a negative 
relationship. On potential explanation for this outcome was that the model was affected 
by gentrification processes. Specifically, given strong gentrification trends during the 
study period, neighborhoods experiencing the highest increase in housing values were 
inner city neighborhoods with lower home ownership and with fewer students attending 
neighborhood schools. Indirectly, the model has identified areas that are experiencing 
elements of gentrification.  
The two distance variables offered differing outcomes relative to locational 
characteristics. DMAJOR revealed a positive relationship with sales price. In other 
words, as the distance to major roads increased, the price of residential property declined. 
The DCBD variable displayed a negative relationship with housing price. Consequently, 
as housing separation from the central business district increased, the sale price was 
lower.  
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For the temporal attributes, the beta coefficients increased in value as expected for 
each successive quarter which mirrored the increase in housing prices experienced in the 
Charlotte region during the study period of 2003-2007. 
In order to better understand the impact of structural attributes, the full model was 
deconstructed to examine model performance across the three real estate submarkets.  
As noted earlier, the explanatory power of the model varied across the three 
submarkets. More critically, the direction of the relationship was also different for some 
of the variables between the groups. The AGE variable had a negative relationship with 
sales price for all three sub-models, while FBATHS, SQFT, and LOTSIZE maintained a 
positive relationship in all three sub-models. However, the middle valued submarkets 
displayed a negative relationship with HBATHS. Therefore, houses in this value group 
with more half baths presented lower housing prices. This relationship may be explained 
by the demand for two full baths in houses in this price category group. For upper valued 
housing submarkets, BEDS and FIRE showed a negative relationship with housing price. 
Thus, the analyses suggest that housing with more bedrooms and fireplaces have lower 
housing prices. The explanation for this relationship was not easily offered. 
 In a similar outcome, the neighborhood variables did not always match the 
expected relationship across the three submarkets. VIOLENT, JUVENILE, 
APPEARANCE, SUBSTANDARD, FOODSTAMP, NWHITE all showed negative beta 
coefficients with sales price. All the variables were statistically significant. 
 In turn, the SIDEWALK, INCOMECHG, and RETAIL variables showed a 
positive relationship with sales price across all three sub-models. All the variables were 
statistically significant except for SIDEWALK for the middle valued housing group. 
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 The remaining variables did not display the posited relationship. The Variables 
CITY, PROPERTY, and TRANSIT were expected to have a negative linkage with sales 
price. But, they showed a positive association. The only exception was PROPERTY 
which had a negative relationship with upper valued housing submarkets. All the 
variables were statistically significant except for CITY in the low valued housing 
submarket. 
 The N_OWNER and NSCHOOLS variables were presumed to show a positive 
relationship with sales price. For the upper valued housing submarket, NSCHOOLS 
featured a positive relationship, but the other two subgroups exhibited a negative 
relationship. All housing subgroups had a negative connection with N_OWNER. 
For the distance attributes, DMAJOR showed a positive correlation with sales 
price in all three housing groups, while DCBD displayed a negative relationship all the 
submarkets. Both variables were statistically significant in cases. 
For the temporal attributes, the sales quarters for all three subgroups generally 
displayed increasing beta coefficient values for each successive quarter indicating the 
housing prices increased during the study period for all submarkets. 
Taken together, the analyses of the structural, neighborhood, temporal and 
location characteristics confirmed the major findings in the literature that these elements 
did matter in terms of housing, neighborhood, and locational preferences of homebuyers. 
Importantly, however, the neighborhood characteristics used in this analysis did provide a 
research enhancement that had not been included in previous research in this area.  
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The second focus of this research was to examine the impact of foreclosure 
activity on homeownership in surrounding residential properties. Within this framework, 
in general, the study posited that the scale and intensity of single-family housing 
foreclosures would reduce the probability that surrounding residential properties would 
be owner-occupied. Four hypotheses were constructed and tested, in order to broadly 
examine this issue. 
Hypothesis 5A 
 Research hypothesis 5 proposed that as the proportion of foreclosures in a 
residential community increased, the homeownership was adversely influenced. As seen 
in Table 10, the hypothesis was supported by the logistic regression analysis. The full 
model X2 test was statistically significant. In other words, the independent variables 
added to the model showed a relationship to homeownership two years post the market 
sale date.  
For our variable of interest, the percent of foreclosed homes in the neighborhood, 
the standardized beta coefficient was -0.105 with an odds ratio of 0.901. With the odds 
ratio less than the reference value of 1 and a negative standardized beta coefficient, the 
relationship was negative. In other words, the housing unit is less likely to be owner 
occupied 2 years after a market sale in neighborhoods as the rates of foreclosure 
increased.  
 In order to better understand foreclosure trends across Charlotte’s housing 
submarkets, the citywide analysis was disaggregated to examine the impact of foreclosure 
across the three real estate submarkets. Thus, the logistic regression analysis was carried 
out in low valued, middle valued, and upper valued housing submarkets.  
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 These results, presented on Table 10, show that foreclosure rates and the negative 
impact on homeownership were exhibited in the lower-income and middle valued 
submarkets two years post market sale. But, foreclosure activity had a positive impact on 
homeownership in the upper valued submarket. All three sub models had significant X2 
tests. In general, the odds ratios moved with housing value changes, with the lower-
income valued housing presenting an odd ratio of 0.893 and middle valued housing with 
an odds ratio 0.865. For the upper valued housing group, the odds ratio of 1.577 indicates 
the probability of homeownership increases two years post transaction as the percentage 
of foreclosed housing increases, however, the relationship was not significant in the 
model.  
 Little research around the effects of foreclosure had not examined data at the 
housing unit level. These new research results showed low valued housing was less likely 
to be owner-occupied as foreclosures increased at the neighborhood level. Put into 
context on recent programs to foster low income homeownership, the results indicated a 
setback in the progress they have made in the past (Wyly, 2001).  
Hypothesis 5B 
Expanding the scope of hypothesis 5, an additional analysis was conducted to see 
if the likelihood of individual housing level ownership was different across 
neighborhoods with different homeownership rates. The purpose of this examination was 
to determine if individual housing ownership in low homeownership neighborhoods were 
impacted by foreclosures differently than individual housing ownership in high 
homeownership neighborhoods. Operationally, neighborhoods with less than 65 percent 
owner-occupied housing were compared to neighborhoods with more than 65 percent 
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owner-occupied housing. The choice of 65 percent matches the average owner-occupied 
housing rate at the NSA scale in Charlotte.  
 As seen in Table 11, the analysis verified the research hypothesis. Foreclosures 
rates adversely impacted housing level ownership in both low and high homeownership 
neighborhoods. Both models had significant model X2 values. The odds ratio for the 
percent of foreclosed housing unit variable was -0.897 for neighborhoods with less than 
65 percent of owner-occupied households. The odds ratio was -0.880 for neighborhoods 
with greater than 65 percent of owner-occupied households. With the odds ratios less 
than the reference value of 1 and a negative standardized beta coefficient, the housing 
unit regardless of the neighborhood homeownership rate is less likely to be owner 
occupied two years after a market sale in neighborhoods as the rates of foreclosure 
increased.  
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 postulated that homeownership was adversely impacted by the close 
proximity to existing or recently foreclosed housing units. The results of the logistic 
regression shown in Table 12 confirmed the thesis. For the concentration of foreclosures 
in the closest distance ring, 0-330 feet, the standardized beta coefficient was -0.053 with 
an odds ratio of 0.948. With the a negative standardized beta coefficient and an odds ratio 
of less than 1,  the probability of homeownership decreases as the percent of foreclosure 
in this distance ring increases. 
The standardized beta coefficient for the concentration of foreclosures at the 331-
660 feet distance ring was -0.022 with the odds ratio increasing to 0.978. The odds ratios 
were significant in the two closest distance rings of foreclosure concentrations. 
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Table 11: Logistic Regression Results for Hypothesis #5 by 
Neighborhood Homeownership 
Neighborhood 
Homeownership Less 
than 65% 
Neighborhood 
Homeownership 
Greater than 65% 
Z-Beta Exp(B) Z-Beta Exp(B) 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Percent of 
Foreclosed 
Housing Units 
-0.108** 0.897 -0.118** 0.889 
(0.018) (0.027)
Structural 
Attributes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood 
Attributes Yes Yes 
Distance 
Attributes Yes Yes 
Year and 
Quarter 
Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 27,198 44,247 
Model X2 
Significance Yes** Yes** 
* P < 0.05, **P< 0.01.  
Source: Author 
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In the 661-990 feet ring, the most distant from the foreclosure the standardized 
beta coefficient dropped to -0.015 with an odds ratio of 0.985. It was not statistically 
significant. Taken together, the analysis suggests that the impact proximity to foreclosed 
homes is diminished as it is stretched. 
 In order to better understand the proximity impacts of foreclosures on home 
ownership across the Charlotte housing market, the analysis was deconstructed across the 
three real estate submarkets. Thus, the logistic regression was carried out in low valued, 
middle valued and upper valued housing submarkets. 
The logistic regression results, presented on Table 12, show that the proximity of 
foreclosure is accompanied by negative impact on homeownership in all low-valued 
housing, and had limited impact on middle valued properties. The odds ratios at the three 
distance rings varied across each submarket. The odds ratio in all distance rings was 
significant for housing valued less than $150,000. Houses in this value range were less 
likely to be owner-occupied 2 year post market sale transaction with the increasing 
concentration of foreclosures at all three distance rings. For the closest distance ring of 
foreclosure concentration, 0-331 feet, the odds ratio was 0.941. The odd ratios increased 
to 0.969 in the 331-660 foot distance ring and increased further to 0.975. The values 
suggest that as the concentration of foreclosure increased at each distance ring, the 
housing units for a market sale property two years post transaction was less likely to be 
owner-occupied. 
A similar trend occurred for the odds ratios in the housing valued between 
$150,000 and $250,000. The closest distance ring of foreclosure concentration displayed 
a statistically significant odds ratio of 0.947. However, the next distance ring of 
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foreclosure concentration had an odds ratio of 0.975. It was not statistically significant. 
The full model of the middle value range housing submarkets produced a X2 that was 
statistically significant.  
The outer most distance ring of foreclosure concentration had an odds ratio of 
1.025.  With an odds ratio greater than 1, the increase in concentration of foreclosure 
results in a higher probability of homeownership. However, the odds ratio was not 
statistically significant.  
For housing valued greater than $250,000, the results indicate that the proximity 
of foreclosure is not significant for any of the distance rings.  Indeed, only the closest 
distance ring has the only odds ratio less than 1 at 0.980.  The values suggest that the 
concentration of foreclosure has a negative impact on foreclosure only on the closest 
distance ring and is less relevant as the housing values increase. The full model of the 
upper value range housing submarkets produced a X2 that was statistically significant.  
 These findings, focused primarily on the proximity effects of foreclosures upon 
housing unit homeownership, offered new empirical evidence that advanced the literature 
in externality theory. While proximity to foreclosure had been shown to negatively 
impact housing prices, these data found the same relationship to homeownership. 
Additionally, the low valued housing market was significantly impacted. 
Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 focused upon the impact of the average time period of mortgage 
foreclosure in the neighborhood, proposing that the longer the average foreclosure, the 
more severe the negative impact upon residential homeownership. The hypothesis was 
supported by logistic regression analysis. See Table 13. The odds ratio for the length of 
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foreclosure variable was 0.965. With the odds ratio less than the reference value of 1, the 
housing units were less likely to be owner-occupied 2 years after the market sale in 
neighborhoods with longer average time periods of mortgage foreclosures. The calculated 
X2 was statistically significant. 
In order to better understand the length of time of mortgage foreclosures across 
the Charlotte housing market, the logistic regression analysis was deconstructed to 
examine the length of foreclosure across the three real estate submarkets. These research 
findings, presented in Table 13, show that the length of foreclosure and the associated 
negative impact on homeownership is confirmed for the lowest valued housing. With an 
odds ratio of 0.937, the probability of homeownership for these low valued housing units 
two years post market sale transaction was diminished. For the middle valued and upper 
valued housing, the odds ratios were positive, but the results were not statistically 
significant. 
Since research related to the length of foreclosure and homeownership was absent 
from the literature, these findings provided new insights. In particular, the negative 
neighborhood effects of bank owned foreclosed properties in low income neighborhoods 
was noteworthy. 
Hypothesis 8 
As stated, hypothesis 8 was that homeownership was influenced by the structural 
attributes of the individual property, neighborhood quality of life characteristics and 
locational elements. As seen in Table 14, the hypothesis was supported by the logistic 
regression analysis. The values used to explain the results in this section reference 
standardized beta coefficients. If the coefficients are negative, then the relationship is 
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Table 14: Logistic Regression Results for Hypothesis #8 
All Single Family 
Assessed 
Value Less 
than 
$150,000 
Assessed 
Value 
$150,000-
$250,000 
Assessed 
Value Greater 
than $250,000 
Z-Beta Z-Beta Z-Beta Z-Beta 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Structural Attributes 
AGE 
0.455** 0.416** 0.822** 0.365
(0.085) (0.112) (0.176) (0.241)
BEDS 
0.119**
(0.014)
0.105**
(0.021)
0.122** 
(0.022) 
0.092*
(0.034)
FBATHS 
0.042*
(0.019)
0.069*
(0.032)
-0.069 
(0.029) 
0.044
(0.038)
HBATHS 
0.042**
(0.014)
0.094**
(0.020)
-0.087** 
(0.028) 
0.032
(0.038)
SQFT  
0.808**
(0.068)
1.846**
(0.228)
0.688* 
(0.241) 
0.567**
(0.230)
FIRE 
 0.106**
(0.011)
0.109**
(0.012)
0.024 
(0.034) 
0.112*
(0.055)
LOTSIZE 
-0.054**
(0.012)
-0.028
(0.019)
-0.078** 
(0.023) 
-0.040
(0.027)
STY_1 0.015
(0.039)
0.042
(0.046)
-0.075 
(0.090) 
0.025
(0.197)
STY_15 -0.030
(0.022)
-.036
(0.028)
-0.037 
(0.046) 
0.080
(0.097)
STY_2 -0.113
(0.042)
-0.166
(0.049)
-0.032 
(0.095) 
0.076
(0.205)
STY_25 -0.032
(0.017)
-0.085
(0.086)
-0.066 
(0.036) 
0.030
(0.054)
RRANCH 0.010
(0.012)
-0.031
(0.016)
-0.025 
(0.024) 
0.028
(0.039)
AD 0.064
(0.058)
0.059
(0.071)
0.022 
(0.132) 
-0.072
(0.299)
HP 0.099
(0.021)
0.087
(0.023)
0.024 
(0.087) 
0.092
(0.139)
HW 0.005
(0.010)
-0.011
(0.015)
0.004 
(0.025) 
0.015
(0.021)
CS 0.007
(0.018)
-0.017
(0.025)
0.036 
(0.031) 
-.014
(0.067)
ALUMVINYL 0.051
(0.092)
0.121
(0.224)
0.017 
(0.205) 
0.100
(0.133)
ASBSDGSHG -0.007
(0.018)
0.010
(0.039)
-0.031 
(0.051) 
-0.086
(0.056)
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CEDARRDWD 0.010
(0.019)
0.126
(0.088)
-0.019 
(0.039) 
0.017
(0.024)
CONCBLOCK -0.013
(-0.013)
-0.006
(0.015)
-0.017 
(0.031) 
-0.022
(0.032)
PLYWOOD -0.005
(0.016)
0.012
(0.035)
-0.056 
(0.045) 
-0.221
(0.092)
FACEBRICK 0.038
(0.076)
0.074
(0.188)
0.046 
(0.171) 
0.039
(0.102)
HARDIPLK 0.005
(0.027)
0.006
(0.068)
0.019 
(0.060) 
-0.009
(0.037)
MASONITE 0.050
(0.063)
0.095
(0.153)
0.025 
(0.140) 
0.059
(0.091)
HRDSTUCC 0.003
(0.021)
-0.028
(0.057)
0.065 
(0.073) 
0.002
(0.027)
SYNSTUCC -0.008
(0.013)
0.028
(0.046)
 
N/A 
-0.014
(0.014)
STGWD 0.014
(0.044)
0.045
(0.108)
0.011 
(0.099) 
0.003
(0.065)
AC 0.089
(0.012)
0.078
(0.013)
0.059 
(0.044) 
0.217
(0.059)
Neighborhood Attributes 
CITY 
0.096*
(0.044)
0.012
(0.015)
0.031 
(0.018) 
0.087*
(0.042)
VIOLENT 
0.047
(0.025)
0.036
(0.027)
0.156 
(0.090) 
0.239
(0.176)
PROPERTY 
0.052**
(0.017)
0.049**
(0.019)
0.040 
(0.059) 
0.037
(0.115)
JUVENILE 
0.003
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.014)
-0.005 
(0.028) 
-0.011
(0.050)
APPEARANCE 
-0.081**
(0.016)
-0.071**
(0.018)
-0.209 
(0.049) 
-0.182
(0.124)
SUBSTANDARD 
-0.055**
(0.011)
-0.053**
(0.012)
0.024 
(0.066) 
0.289
(0.196)
N_OWNER 
-0.029
(0.018)
-0.041
(0.024)
-0.041 
(0.038) 
-0.002
(0.068)
SIDEWALK 
-0.004
(0.016)
0.013
(0.023)
-0.035 
(0.030) 
-0.058
(0.012)
INCOMECHG 
0.033
(0.017)
0.049*
(0.024)
0.047 
(0.034) 
-0.026
(0.246)
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FOODSTAMP 
-0.182**
(0.022)
-0.161**
(0.024)
-0.277** 
(0.068) 
-0.416*
(0.197)
TRANSIT 
-0.036
(0.023)
-0.092**
(0.029)
0.187** 
(0.057) 
-0.066
(0.096)
RETAIL 
0.005
(0.013)
0.015
(0.017)
-0.050 
(0.033) 
-0.019
(0.044)
NWHITE 
-0.104**
(0.022)
-0.060
(0.009)
0.006 
(0.046) 
-0.178*
(0.087)
NSCHOOLS 
-0.048*
(0.019)
-0.186*
(0.033)
-0.076* 
(0.035) 
0.052
(0.051)
Distance Attributes 
DMAJOR (00s) 
0.053**
(0.011)
0.062**
(0.016)
0.058** 
(0.020) 
0.057
(0.032)
DCBD (miles) 
-0.094
(0.084)
0.020
(0.121)
-0.259 
(0.192) 
-0.261
(0.280)
DCBD2 (miles)  
Temporal Attributes 
Y2003_Q1 0.016
(0.016)
-0.031
(0.020)
0.094 
(0.031) 
0.057
(0.051)
Y2004_Q2 0.030
(0.017)
0.003
(0.023)
0.065 
(0.031) 
0.049
(0.050)
Y2003_Q3 0.037
(0.017)
0.002
(0.023)
0.094 
(0.032) 
0.043
(0.052)
Y2003_Q4 0.024
(0.016)
-0.024
(0.023)
0.078 
(0.032) 
0.039
(0.051)
Y2004_Q1 -0.005
(0.015)
-0.038
(0.021)
0.017 
(0.028) 
0.046
(0.049)
Y2004_Q2 0.026
(0.018)
-0.018
(0.024)
0.090 
(0.032) 
0.038
(0.052)
Y2004_Q3 0.020
(0.017)
-0.031
(0.023)
0.082 
(0.030) 
0.051
(0.051)
Y2004_Q4 0.024
(0.016)
-0.018
(0.022)
0.078 
(0.032) 
0.054
(0.051)
Y2005_Q1 -0.003
(0.015)
-0.046
(0.020)
0.059 
(0.027) 
0.005
(0.046)
Y2005_Q2 0.023
(0.017)
-0.030
(0.023)
0.102 
(0.031) 
0.026
(0.051)
Y2005_Q3 -0.008
(0.017)
-0.047
(0.023)
0.004 
(0.030) 
0.103
(0.056)
Y2005_Q4 -0.002
(0.017)
-0.043
(0.023)
0.057 
(0.030) 
-0.002
(0.051)
Y2006_Q1 -0.056
(0.016)
-0.055
(0.021)
0.034 
(0.028) 
-0.010
(0.049)
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Y2006_Q2 -0.035
(0.018)
-0.064
(0.024)
-0.016 
(0.030) 
-0.003
(0.054)
Y2006_Q3 -0.045
(0.016)
-0.076
(0.022)
-0.002 
(0.026) 
-0.026
(0.049)
Y2006_Q4 -0.037
(0.015)
-0.081
(0.021)
0.028 
(0.026) 
-0.005
(0.047)
Y2007_Q1 -0.027
(0.015)
-0.055
(0.020)
0.010 
(0.024) 
-0.010
(0.044)
Y2007_Q2 0.005
(0.016)
-0.029
(0.022)
0.055 
(0.026) 
0.008
(0.047)
Y2007_Q3 -0.004
(0.015)
-0.044
(0.021)
0.048 
(0.026) 
0.025
(0.046)
Y2007_Q4 
()
 
() ()
Foreclosure Attributes 
D330HU 
-0.053**
(0.009)
-0.061**
(0.011)
-0.055** 
(0.019) 
-0.020
(0.034)
D660HU 
-0.022*
(0.010)
-0.032**
(0.011)
-0.026 
(0.024) 
0.130
(0.080)
D990HU 
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.025*
(0.011)
0.025 
(0.024) 
0.088
(0.070)
Observations 72,061 34,251 25,960 11,850
Model X2 
Significance Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes**
* P < 0.05, **P< 0.01.  
Source: Author 
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negative and the odds ratios would be less than 1. In other words, as the value decreases 
the likelihood of homeownership increases. If the coefficient is positive, then the 
relationship is positive and the odds ratios would be greater than 1. In other words, as the 
value increases, the likelihood of homeownership increases. While the percent of 
foreclosed properties, proximity of foreclosed properties, and length of foreclosure were 
all tested using the full model of structural, neighborhood, distance and temporal 
attributes, the results for the proximity of foreclosures were used to describe the 
relationships with the variables in the full model.  
For the structural variables, a housing unit was more likely to be owner-occupied 
two years post transaction for older units, rather than newer units. This positive 
relationship could be explained by the fact that many newer homes were located in 
neighborhoods that were more likely to be converted to rentals than older sold in the 
same time period. For the variables BEDS, FBATHS, FBATHS, SQFT, FIRE, the 
housing units were more likely to be owner-occupied as the variable values increased. 
Conversely, the LOTSIZE variable presented a negative probability of homeownership 
that was not expected. So that, homeownership was more likely as lot sizes became 
smaller. This trend might be explained by the increase in smaller lot development in 
newer housing being sold during the study. The model also included an additional 21 
structural variables where sufficient data available. These variables included siding 
material, foundation type, structure quality, number of stories, heating type, air 
conditioning type. These variables did not have significance in the overall model. 
The neighborhood attributes did not always perform in the expected direction or 
offer statistical significance. Among the variables that did operate as expected were 
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APPEARANCE, SUBSTANDARD, FOODSTAMP, and NWHITE. All of these 
variables produced negative relationships indicating that housing units were more likely 
to be owner-occupied as these variables decreased at the neighborhood level. In contrast, 
PROPERTY showed a positive relationship to homeownership, which was not expected. 
Another unexpected finding, variable NSCHOOLS showed a negative relationship with 
homeownership. The remaining neighborhood attributes did not gain significance. 
Among the distance attributes, DMAJOR presented a positive relationship with 
homeownership. Therefore, a housing units is more likely to be owner-occupied the 
greater the distance from a non-residential street. For the temporal attributes, not of the 
sales quarters were significant which indicated that there was no detectable pattern of 
homeownership two years post transaction between 2003 and 2007. 
In order to better understand the impact of structural attributes of the individual 
property, neighborhood quality of life characteristics, temporal, and locational elements, 
the full model was deconstructed to examine the relationship across the three real estate 
assessment submarkets using the logistic regression analysis. All three sub models had X2 
results that were significant.  
 These findings are presented on Table 14. For the low valued housing submarket, 
the positive relationships evidenced in the full model were reproduced. For variables 
BEDS, HBATHS, FBATHS, SQFT, FIRE, the housing units were more likely to be 
owner-occupied as these values increased. LOTSIZE did not have significance.  
The analysis of middle valued housing resulted in similar statistically significant 
positive relationships for the variables AGE, BEDS and SQFT. But, HBATHS exhibited 
a negative relationship. This relationship might be explained by housing in this value 
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range with 1 ½ baths have lower market demand then housing with 2 baths. LOTSIZE 
also exhibited a negative relationship with homeownership. As previously stated, housing 
in this price range were built on smaller lots were more likely to be owner-occupied than 
larger lots. FIRE and FBATHS were not statistically significant.  
For upper valued housing submarkets, the variables BEDS, SQFT, and FIRE all 
had positive relationships with homeownership as expected.  FBATHS, HBATHS, and 
LOTSIZE were not statistically significant. The remaining structural characteristics in the 
model were not significant. 
 The neighborhood variables did not always offer the expected relationship nor 
significance, but presented differences across the three sub-models. For the low valued 
real estate submarket, APPEARANCE, SUBSTANDARD, and FOODSTAMP had the 
expected negative relationship with homeownership. In other words, as these variables 
increased, a housing unit was less likely to be owner-occupied. NSCHOOLS and 
TRANSIT also had a negative relationship with homeownership which was not expected. 
INCOMECHG had a positive relationship with homeownership which was expected. 
These findings showed that as income increases, the likelihood of homeownership grew. 
PROPERTY also had a positive relationship, which was not expected. CITY, VIOLENT, 
JUVENILE, N_OWNER, SIDEWALK, RETAIL, and NWHITE did not have a 
significant relationship with homeownership in this submarket. 
 For middle valued housing, FOODSTAMP exhibited a negative relationship with 
homeownership as expected. TRANSIT had a positive relationship with homeownership 
in this value range as expected. NSCHOOLS also had a negative relationship with 
homeownership. The result mirrored the low valued housing submarket findings.  As was 
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previously presented, one explanation for this relationship may be attributed to the impact 
of gentrification in housing markets that was widely evidenced in neighborhoods with 
lower rates of neighborhood school attendance. The remaining neighborhood variables in 
the middle valued housing submarkets were not statistically significant with the 
homeownership rates.  
 Analysis for the upper valued housing submarkets found a positive relationship 
between CITY and homeownership. In other words, housing in this category was more 
likely to be owner-occupied two year post market sales transaction within the city limits 
than outside the city limits. FOODSTAMP and NWHITE had a negative relationship 
with homeownership as expected. Therefore, upper valued homes were more likely to be 
owner-occupied in neighborhoods with fewer food stamp recipients and non-white public 
school students. The remaining neighborhood level variables were not statistically 
significant. 
 For the distance variable category, DMAJOR or distance to major roads had a 
positive relationship with lower and middle valued housing. The farther away these 
homes were from major roads, the more likely the homes were owner-occupied. While 
distance to the center city, DCBD, did not have significance with homeownership. Within 
the upper valued housing submarkets, not of the distance attributes were statistically 
significant. Similarly, none of the temporal attributes had any statistically significance 
with homeownership in any of the submarkets examined. 
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 Since previous research has not carried out homeownership level analysis7, the 
results from my analysis furthered the literature. In particular, these findings could be 
utilized to help develop strategies to attract potential owners in this market.  
Validity Tests 
The residuals from house price analysis were analyzed using Moran’s I and 
displayed significant spatial autocorrelation at 0.5. An auto regressive analysis was 
conducted to reduce spatial autocorrelation. While the analysis reduced the spatial 
autocorrelation detected using Moran’s I to 0.22, spatial autocorrelation still exists and 
the results should be interpreted with caution. 
A test for heteroskedasticity was also conducted to determine if the residuals 
showed any additional patterns bias. The test did not indicate problems with 
heteroskedasticity with the data set. 
Prior to the analysis of the variables, a bivariate correlation was conducted on the 
all the variables. Correlations between two variables above 0.7 indicated problems with 
multi-colinearity. Violent Crime and Violent Crime Hot Spots were correlated above 0.7. 
Violent Crime Hot Spots was removed and replaced with Juvenile Arrest Data. After the 
analysis was conducted, VIF scores were reviewed to further assess for multi-colinearity 
and none were above 7 for the variables discussed. Variable diagnostics are presented in 
Appendix C.
                                                 
7 Clauretie (2006) analyzed Multiple Listing Service data showing that owner-occupied housing returned a 
higher selling price than renter-occupied or vacant housing. However, these data did not include For Sale 
By Owner transactions. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION, FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES  
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Between 2003 and 2007, over 10,000 single family housing units foreclosures 
occurred in Charlotte. More than 90 percent of these foreclosures were housing assessed 
less than $150,000. Additionally, over 8 percent of these foreclosures were housing 
assessed between $150,000 and $250,000, while less than 2 percent were over $250,000. 
These data anchor the contention that lower-income and middle-income households were 
primarily impacted by these foreclosures. At the neighborhood level, homogenous 
communities comprised of single family detached housing with assessed values of less 
than $150,000 suffered the greatest decline in housing prices. Following in severity were 
the single family residential subdivisions with middle valued housing between $150,000 
and $250,000. These differential foreclosure impacts provided empirical evidence for 
supporting the incipient literature that low and middle income neighborhoods have been 
more afflicted by mortgage defaults (Belsky, 2008). 
While the decline in market value in these neighborhoods negatively impacted a 
foreclosed owner’s net worth, the foreclosure effect impacted adjacent properties and the 
surrounding neighborhood. The concentration of foreclosed homes in Charlotte’s low and 
middle income neighborhoods presented new challenges to already at-risk communities. 
Despite the national efforts to increase homeownership and improve the amenities of in 
lower income neighborhoods, these residents now must deal with the new blighted 
 
 
 
 
 
landscape created by foreclosure, which represented another obstacle for creating vibrant 
healthy neighborhoods. This summary set the stage for assessing the impact of 
foreclosures on the Charlotte market sale housing and homeownership during the early 
part of the 21st century.  
The findings of the research modeling showed that proximity to foreclosures had 
a statistically significant negative impact on housing prices in the two lowest value 
housing market, with the most definitive impact on housing prices in the lowest value 
group in neighborhoods with higher rates of foreclosure. The length of foreclosure was 
also shown to have a negative impact on housing prices in the lowest valued group. 
While the nuisance externality of foreclosure had already been identified in the literature, 
this study found that housing prices in lower priced neighborhoods were more seriously 
affected. Furthermore, in low wealth neighborhoods, if foreclosures were located in 
proximity to market sales, homes were less likely to be owner-occupied two years after 
the transaction. This relationship was especially pernicious since these findings described 
a “domino effect”. That is to say, in communities with large numbers of foreclosures, the 
presence of empty homes leads to further declines in the neighborhood.  
Other modeling results pointed out that structural, neighborhood and distance 
attributes also influenced the likelihood that homes were owner occupied. Specifically, 
owner occupancy was linked to larger homes in neighborhoods with higher rates of 
income change, fewer appearance and housing code violations. These neighborhoods 
were less diverse both racially and economically. Distance from non-residential streets 
was also a significant predictor of owner-occupied homes.  
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A related analytical theme was the impact of these variables on housing values. 
These modeling results identified a number of statistically significant relationships. In 
general, as most variables increased in value as the housing prices were higher. 
Specifically, home size, lot size, number of bedrooms, and bathrooms all increased as the 
home price were higher. The only exception was the age, which was inversely linked to 
home value.  
What is the significance of these research findings? Although my research was 
limited to a single community and a narrow 5 year band of time, it did offer scholastic 
insights that were unique. To the best of my knowledge, this study was the first to 
incorporate the average length of time a house was foreclosed in the relationship to 
housing prices. While the differential impact of foreclosure had been examined, this was 
the first study where the proximity of foreclosure for different housing submarkets was 
analyzed in relationship to sales price. This is also the first study to analyze housing unit 
ownership grouped into different market and identify if the percent of foreclosed homes, 
proximity to foreclosed homes and length of foreclosure had any impact on the likelihood 
of homeownership. Also, the relationship of structural, neighborhood and location 
elements to housing unit homeownership had not been thoroughly examined. 
Because of the unique local data resources, the findings of this study offered 
extensions of current theoretic constructs surrounding the urban housing market and 
urban social geography in the U.S. As discussed previously, the dominant trends in 
American urban growth in the post-World War II milieu was suburbanization. The 
expansive growth in lower density housing on the edge of existing urban areas was fueled 
by white, middle class families. The suburban housing vision was framed by enhanced 
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quality of life for families, escape from social ills in the city, and economic 
advancements. Single family housing in the suburbs increased in value. Home equity 
translated into social stability and personal wealth. Housing programs that encouraged 
low income home ownership, and the exotic mortgage market in the late twentieth 
century, spurred the growth in a new wave of suburban single family subdivisions for 
first-time, low income householders. 
However, these households were at greater risk of defaulting on their mortgages 
for two main reasons. Because they were low- to middle income to start with, they have 
fewer resources to rely on if they suffered financial hard times. Second, they were also 
more likely to have a subprime mortgage which sometimes created increased mortgage 
costs after a short time period that maybe unaffordable even for households with steady 
incomes. The patterns of foreclosures in Figure 15 revealed that fragile states of the vinyl 
villages or starter subdivisions that predominated residential growth in Northwest and 
North Charlotte.  The collapse of the starter home market raised challenges for the widely 
held assumptions of suburbanization. In a variety of ways, large scale foreclosure 
followed by housing abandonment, visible decline in neighborhood character and 
incessant crime mirrored the traditional markers on inner city neighborhood deterioration. 
We may be observing a new 21st century suburban slum (Wehrwein, 1942). These areas 
face the same challenges and issues that challenged their twentieth century urban peers. 
Only now, the geographical settings were reversed. 
While the suburban slum term proposed by Wehrewein refered to unplanned 
subdivisions or shanty towns between the rural and urban fringe creating increased costs 
for local governments, the 21st century suburban slums created by the foreclosure effect 
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are in reality the same. Pockets of escalating decay in what were formerly greenfield sites 
with  newly built homes were either abandoned or bought by investers to rent. Instead of 
slow neighborhood change that can take many years in a urban working class 
neighborhoods during the 1990’s, community change was now occuring in a matter of 
three to five years.  
My research findings presented in Figure 19 offer a different perspective on the 
housing market of inner city neighborhoods. 
Figure 19, Average Change in Housing Market Sale, 2003-2007 
Source: Author compiled from Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds 
 
129
 
 
 
 
 
A review of the map shows neighborhoods experiencing largest sales price gains during 
the study periods were located closest to the center city. These communities also 
experienced less foreclosure pressure. The robust real estate market in these 
neighborhoods was linked to gentrification. Cartographically, the gentrifying areas were 
pockets of stability in a sea of housing distress. In turn, these sharp difference between 
inner city neighborhood supported the arguments made by Wyly (2001) suggesting the 
dissimilarity between urban gentrifiers and existing low income residents. This 
differential had the potential of creating increased tension between current residents and 
gentrifiers who were able to withstand fluctuations in the real estate market, pay the 
escalating property taxes, and begin to socially reshape neighborhood life. In this way, 
this research extends our understanding of the persistence and economic impact of 
gentrification in urban neighborhoods during a period of high foreclosure activity 
Future Research 
As with any research project, there were improvements or enhancements to the 
efforts that were discovered after the project had been started. This dissertation was no 
exception. The concluding section of this report offers my suggestions and ideas for 
future work.  
As part of this research, all market sales recorded by the register of deeds were 
included in the study. But, information related to length of time a home was on the 
market was not captured. Since most market sales were contained in the Multiple Listing 
Service (MLS), this information could be included in future research. The caveat 
associated with MLS is that these data are proprietary, and it does not include For Sale 
By Owner (FSBO) activity. While the FSBO may be a small proportion of the total real 
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estate transactions, it does lead to missing data and may affect the variability 
neighborhoods’ housing market. This would be true especially if the owner tried to sell 
the property before listing with a MLS.  
Another component to be considered by future research pertains to mortgage 
default filings. When the homeowner defaults on a mortgage, the mortgage company will 
file a foreclosure notice. In many instances, there will be multiple filings before the 
property is auctioned or the loan is modified. In some cases the same housing unit is also 
still listed as for sale.  As a consequence, these can lead to misinformation and data 
accuracy problems. What is the real status of the home? Clarity or at least an objective 
way to classify real estate status is needed. In a related fashion, better data surrounding 
short sales would also provide an opportunity for future research. Short sales were 
considered distressed, but are not a real foreclosure in terms of the impact on the 
homeowner’s credit report. Future research models would be enhanced if short sale 
information could be included. This is especially important for measuring community 
impact as short sales may affect property values and neighborhood conditions. 
 During this research, foreclosure transactions were identified from the register of 
deeds. However, the transaction price for the foreclosure was not consistently recorded. 
Future research would be strengthened if a systematic approach could be established to 
capture these actual foreclosure price transactions. Although foreclosures are not market 
sale transactions, they may represent a viable housing transaction cost.  Furthermore, 
evidence suggests that these transactions were being used in the comprehensive 
revaluation of the real estate property in Mecklenburg County properties and appraisals 
for mortgages lending (Bethea 2010). With these concerns in mind, future research may 
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want to design a process to determine the price impact of foreclosures and include in the 
analytics. 
While this research did not examine the causes for foreclosure, the author 
suspects that many neighborhoods in Charlotte were impacted by more than one study 
component during the study period. There was much anecdotal evidence that the 
concentration in foreclosures in starter home communities was linked to unscrupulous or 
illegal business practices marketed toward lower income households, centered around 
sub-prime loans. Along with that, some developers may have been using fraudulent 
practices to sell homes as higher prices than the homes were actually worth. The 
combination of all these factors plus the overall economy led to an implosion of the 
housing market in selected portions of Charlotte and the surrounding region. While these 
practices were regularly reported in the Charlotte Observer (Crouch 2005), scientific 
research requires additional analysis to systematically determine the impact of 
foreclosure. Since loan information is only provided aggregately at the census tract level, 
the unit of analysis for the database would need to be modified to fit census geography. 
With the release of the newly enhanced 2010 American Community Survey, a real 
opportunity exists for future researchers to measure the changing neighborhood 
conditions at the census tract level with data provided by the federal home loan system to 
assess the reasons for foreclosure and the impact on neighborhoods.  
Future research, focused on Charlotte, could also benefit from use of this study as 
a starting point or baseline. This research project offers insights into the Charlotte 
housing market before the national economic recession and collapse of the national real 
estate market. During the study period of 2003-2007, the overall Charlotte economy was 
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improving, housing prices were increasing on average, and the unemployment rate was 
steady.  
 By 2010, Charlotte real estate market was mired in the lowest number of market 
sales since the 1990s. The average price of market sale housing increased. But, these 
transactions encompassed only 50 percent of the transactions in the Charlotte housing 
market. Since nearly half of the transactions consisted of foreclosures, it was increasingly 
difficult to value the real price of real estate when most or all of the transitions were 
foreclosures in some neighborhoods.  
The foreclosure trends during 2009 and 2010 were further clouded by various 
moratoriums that were enacted by lenders or mortgage holders. For example, in Center 
City Charlotte a number of condominium real estate properties were pressured to convert 
to rental or partial rental properties. While all housing developments have different 
lifecycles with newer housing development having higher rates of homeownership, the 
rate of conversion from owner-occupied to rentals can be different between single family 
detached and rentals. These differences represent another opportunity for future 
scholarship examining the relationship of homeownership and foreclosures.  
To better understand the different buying behavior across housing types, a buyer 
survey or focus group would be a valuable tool to better understand the motivations of 
buying housing in certain neighborhoods. For example, the survey or focus group might 
be able to distinguish between preferences between single family and multi-family 
housing and determine why consumers ultimately select between housing types. 
Qualitative surveys could also probe the subject of foreclosures. These data collected 
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might examine the perceptions of foreclosures in the neighborhood or help differentiate 
between market sales of existing homes versus buying real estate from a bank.  
One impact of foreclosures on homeownership not examined in this research was 
the dimensions of future ownership of foreclosed properties. While the summary statistics 
suggest that distinct long term differences exist between foreclosures and market sales, 
the reasons behind this discrepancy were not fully explored. Antidotal evidence suggests 
that the difficulty of purchasing a foreclosed property deters most potential homeowners 
even though the savings could be quite dramatic. Conversely, investors who have 
different motivations may have more time and patience to deal with banks. Survey and 
focus group strategies may be able to capture the difference. Indeed, broadly speaking 
qualitative research into buying behaviors, characteristics, foreclosure perceptions, and 
bank owned properties would fill in the missing information that the current housing 
research has not currently assessed. 
In the 1990’s, the federal government developed programs designed to increase 
minority and lower income household homeownership. In turn, disadvantaged groups 
showed enormous gains in homeownership through 2006. Since many of the programs 
made it easy to buy housing through sweat equity, down payment grants, and subsidized 
interest rates, these groups benefited greatly with achieving American dream of 
homeownership. More recently, these groups were at the greatest risk of losing their 
homes to foreclosure. Federal programs developed to make it easy to buy housing did not 
prepare the homeowners with the financial reality of maintaining property.  Targeting by 
lenders marketing sub-prime mortgage products, many low-income or minority 
homeowners refinanced their homes into riskier loans that tapped into home equity. 
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During the economic recession and housing bubble, many of these sub-prime loans made 
it extremely difficult to maintain mortgage payments especially for households with 
limited financial means. The American dream often turned into the foreclosure nightmare 
as homeowners have systematically lost their homes and all financials benefits invested. 
The collapse of homeownership rates among lower income and minority 
households indicates the current housing policies need review and adjustment. 
Homeownership programs for lower income households need to take a long terms 
approach. Because a substantial portion of their savings is in the equity of their homes, 
more flexible options are needed to help withstand the fluctuations in income that occur 
as the result of periods of unemployment and underemployment. If the goal is to increase 
homeownership across in these more economically challenged households, the 
infrastructure for dealing with their situations needs to be reworked. While banks and 
mortgage companies require private mortgage insurance for down payments for less than 
20 percent, homeowners should be able to purchase mortgage insurance to cover 
payments when all other financial resources have been exhausted. This will maintain the 
security of providing housing to a household during a truly difficult economic hardship.  
Another policy option for homeownership is to allow partial ownership programs. 
The government can provide opportunities for homeowners to but partial shares in the 
housing they live in. By providing this option, the homeowner can maintain a lower 
housing payment that will less likely exceed their recommended portion of income. Since 
these households live with less stable working histories, they can better manage their 
overall households responsibilities without worrying about losing their homes and any 
built up equity (Clarke 2007).  
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The trends in homeownership occurring over the past several years as the result of 
the changing economic situation provide a unique opportunity to assess neighborhood 
evolution. Since the economy has not experienced such a severe downturn since the Great 
Depression, a once in a lifetime opportunity to research foreclosure impacts on 
neighborhoods long term viability has presented itself. The data suggests that 
neighborhood conditions can change quite rapidly. For example, drawing on existing 
literature and urban geography theory, one might hypothesize those newer suburban 
neighborhoods less than 10 years old would move down the neighborhood lifecycle faster 
than older neighborhoods, 10 to 20 years old. The change could be attributed to 
increasing numbers of foreclosures leading to an increased turnover in households that 
resulted in lower levels of homeownership. The research completed thus far provides the 
critical foundation for this proposed work and indicates a striking difference in the 
expected development and evolution of our urban neighborhoods. 
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APPENDIX A: NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Violent  - Violent crime rate in each NSA as compared with the violent crime rate 
in the City of Charlotte. The locations of violent crime offenses were summarized for 
each NSA and the City of Charlotte. For the purpose of this study, violent crimes include 
homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults defined according to UCR (Uniform 
Crime Report) standards. The number of violent crime incidents for each NSA and the 
City of Charlotte were divided by their respective populations to get the violent crime 
rate for each NSA and the City of Charlotte.  
The Location Quotient method was used to compare the NSA and city wide rate. 
The method gives a measure of the share of all violent crime in the City of Charlotte 
captured by the individual NSA. Thus, a score of 2.00 indicates that the particular NSA 
has a violent crime rate that is twice the rate in the city; while a score of 0.5 shows that 
the NSA violent crime rate is one-half the rate of the entire city. 
Source: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Research and Planning Department 
Juvenile - Juvenile arrest rate in each NSA as compared with the juvenile arrest 
rate in the City of Charlotte. The locations of juvenile arrests were summarized for each 
NSA and the City of Charlotte. For the purpose of this study, juvenile arrests are based on 
individuals arrested under the age of 16. This definition is based on North Carolina state 
statutes which generally define a juvenile offender according to this age definition.  
The number of juvenile arrest incidents for each NSA and the City of Charlotte were 
divided by their respective juvenile populations to get the juvenile arrest rate. 
 The Location Quotient method was used to compare the NSA and city wide rate. 
The method gives a measure of the share of all juvenile arrests in the City of Charlotte 
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captured by the individual NSA. Thus, a score of 2.00 indicates that the particular NSA 
has a juvenile arrest rate that is twice the rate in the city; while a score of 0.5 shows that 
the NSA juvenile arrest rate is one-half the rate of the entire city. 
Source: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Research and Planning Department 
 Property - Property crime rate in each NSA as compared with the property crime 
rate in the City of Charlotte. The locations of property crime offenses were summarized 
for each NSA and the City of Charlotte. For the purpose of this study, property crimes 
include burglaries, larcenies, vehicle thefts, arsons, and vandalisms defined according to 
UCR (Uniform Crime Report) standards. The number of property crime incidents for 
each NSA and the City of Charlotte were divided by their respective populations to get 
the property crime rate.  
 The Location Quotient method was used to compare the NSA and city wide rate. 
The method gives a measure of the share of all property crime in the City of Charlotte 
captured by the individual NSA. Thus, a score of 2.00 indicates that the particular NSA 
has a property crime rate that is twice the rate in the city; while a score of 0.5 shows that 
the NSA property crime rate is one-half the rate of the entire city. 
Source: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Research and Planning Department 
APPEARANCE  - Index of code violations for each NSA. The violations 
recorded were summarized for each NSA. The number of documented violations was 
divided by the total number of parcels in the NSA. 
 Source: Neighborhood and Business Services 
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SUBSTANDARD - Percentage of housing units in a NSA with housing code 
violations.  The violations recorded were summarized for each NSA. The number of 
documented violations was divided by the total number of housing units in the NSA.  
Source: Neighborhood and Business Services 
N_OWNER - Percentage of owner-occupied residential units.  
Source: Mecklenburg County Property Records and Land Management 
Transit  - Percentage of NSA residents, who live within walking distance of 
public transportation, using the Charlotte Area Transit System bus stops. By utilizing the 
tax parcel database, the total number housing units and the total number of housing units 
within ¼ mile of a bus-stop were compiled for each NSA. The transit accessible housing 
units were divided by the total number of housing units.  
Source: Charlotte Area Transit System 
RETAIL – Percentage of NSA residents that are within walking distance to a 
grocery store and/or a pharmacy. By utilizing the tax parcel database, the total number 
housing units and the total number of housing units within one-quarter mile of a grocery 
store and/or pharmacy were compiled for each NSA. The retail accessible housing units 
were divided by the total number of housing units.  
Sources: Mecklenburg County Property Records and Land Management; Yellow Pages, 
Charlotte 
SIDEWALK -  Pedestrian friendliness based on the total length of sidewalks in 
each NSA as compared to the total length of the streets. Index values could rank from 0-
2.0. The index score were scaled using the following qualitative ranking. 
0.0 - 1.0 Low Pedestrian Friendliness; 1.1 - 1.3 Medium Pedestrian Friendliness;  
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1.4+ High Pedestrian Friendliness 
Source: Charlotte Department of Transportation 
FOODSTAMP - The percentage of people in a NSA receiving Food Stamps.  
Sources: Mecklenburg County Department of Social Service Office of Planning and 
Evaluation 
INCOMECHG - Percentage change in median household income per year. The 
following equation was used: 
Specific Year Income – 1999 income 
1999 income     *   100 =  % Change in Income 
Source: Claritas; Census 2000. 
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APPENDIX B: DISTANCE RING SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
 
Prior to developing the finalizing the model used to test Hypothesis #2, I analyzed 
the foreclosures at distance rings of 0 to 670 feet, 671 to 1,340 feet, and 1,341 to 2640 
feet. The results displayed in the Appendix,  Table 15, show housing prices adversely 
impacted by the proximity of foreclosure for each distance ring. However, most of the 
foreclosures were occurring in the lowest value housing group. Moreover, the descriptive 
statistics suggested that neighborhoods composed of lower valued housing units 
presented with higher proportions of foreclosure activity, 1.5 percent versus the overall 
average of 1.0 percent. With this context, my research design was realigned to measure 
the impact of foreclosures at an intra-neighborhood scale, therefore the distance 
measurement was reduced to a narrower impact zone. By making the zones smaller, the 
analysis was better able to pick up the immediate proximity of vacant housing and other 
nuisance behavior that would not be as relevant at larger distance rings. 
 Using Figure 14 as an example, the analysis utilized only incorporated locations 
with the housing unit’s neighborhood. If the distance rings were made larger, they would 
have included units outside the neighborhood and sub-neighborhood differences would 
not be detected. Since Hypothesis #1 captured the neighborhood level foreclosure impact 
on housing prices, Hypothesis #2 was able to differentiate any negative impacts of 
foreclosure within a neighborhood. 
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLE DIAGNOSTICS 
Table 16: Variable Diagnostics 
t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 768.616 0.000
AGE -20.148 0.000 0.225 4.437 
BEDS 1.687 0.092 0.593 1.687 
FBATHS 16.885 0.000 0.331 3.019 
HBATHS 3.837 0.000 0.494 2.023 
SQFT 136.562 0.000 0.244 4.092 
FIRE 26.21 0.000 0.725 1.380 
LOTSIZE 25.104 0.000 0.650 1.538 
STY_1 -6.822 0.000 0.345 2.896 
STY_15 14.061 0.000 0.876 1.142 
STY_25 -5.342 0.000 0.891 1.123 
A_FRAME -1.239 0.215 0.998 1.002 
BILEVEL -10.509 0.000 0.960 1.041 
CAPECOD -2.073 0.038 0.990 1.010 
RRANCH -4.572 0.000 0.962 1.040 
SPLITLEVEL -14.603 0.000 0.824 1.214 
BASEBOARD 3.359 0.001 0.795 1.257 
HP 3.193 0.001 0.542 1.844 
HW 4.589 0.000 0.988 1.012 
CELL_RD 0.28 0.779 0.999 1.001 
STEAM 1.473 0.141 0.799 1.251 
ELECTRIC -11.653 0.000 0.462 2.167 
NONE -5.27 0.000 0.876 1.141 
OWC -6.635 0.000 0.929 1.076 
SOLAR 0.838 0.402 0.800 1.250 
CS 13.833 0.000 0.394 2.535 
ASBSDGSHG -6.86 0.000 0.877 1.140 
BOARDBATTE 0.346 0.729 0.991 1.009 
CEDARRDWD 10.213 0.000 0.905 1.105 
CEM_BRSPL 0.715 0.475 0.998 1.002 
COMPWALL -5.377 0.000 0.990 1.010 
CONCBLOCK -1.035 0.301 0.955 1.047 
LGT_CORR 0.403 0.687 0.999 1.001 
PLYWOOD -6.205 0.000 0.942 1.061 
FACEBRICK 12.578 0.000 0.372 2.687 
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Table 16, Continued 
HARDIPLK 11.383 0.000 0.848 1.179 
JUMBBRICK -0.549 0.583 0.997 1.003 
MASONITE -12.346 0.000 0.760 1.316 
SDGNONE -0.785 0.433 0.999 1.001 
SIDINGNS -1.501 0.133 0.976 1.024 
STONE -0.025 0.980 0.996 1.004 
HRDSTUCC 12.927 0.000 0.844 1.185 
SYNSTUCC 0.388 0.698 0.968 1.033 
STGWD -4.913 0.000 0.660 1.516 
SHINGWD 12.289 0.000 0.931 1.074 
BELOW -16.078 0.000 0.906 1.104 
CUSTOM 48.751 0.000 0.852 1.173 
EXCELLENT 43.047 0.000 0.765 1.306 
GOOD 54.823 0.000 0.553 1.808 
VG 56.929 0.000 0.554 1.805 
AC 23.754 0.000 0.602 1.661 
CITY -5.416 0.000 0.897 1.114 
VIOLENT -6.281 0.000 0.141 6.758 
PROPERTY 15.07 0.000 0.304 3.286 
JUVENILE -12.366 0.000 0.689 1.450 
APPEARANCE -34.254 0.000 0.313 3.190 
SUBSTANDARD -12.39 0.000 0.576 1.736 
N_OWNER -17.086 0.000 0.312 3.203 
SIDEWALK 45.722 0.000 0.547 1.829 
INCOMECHG 11.755 0.000 0.401 2.497 
FOODSTAMP -32.222 0.000 0.166 6.028 
TRANSIT 9.526 0.000 0.195 5.116 
RETAIL 11.037 0.000 0.554 1.806 
NWHITE -79.075 0.000 0.229 4.375 
NSCHOOLS -9.914 0.000 0.328 3.048 
DMAJOR 10.681 0.000 0.909 1.100 
DCBD -37.827 0.000 0.205 4.880 
Y2003_Q1 -35.956 0.000 0.669 1.494 
Y2003_Q2 -38.598 0.000 0.622 1.609 
Y2003_Q3 -37.203 0.000 0.604 1.656 
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Table 16, Continued 
Y2003_Q4 -36.612 0.000 0.638 1.567 
Y2004_Q1 -27.435 0.000 0.668 1.496 
Y2004_Q2 -27.223 0.000 0.573 1.744 
Y2004_Q3 -25.258 0.000 0.599 1.671 
Y2004_Q4 -23.228 0.000 0.624 1.604 
Y2005_Q1 -19.101 0.000 0.687 1.457 
Y2005_Q2 -17.202 0.000 0.589 1.697 
Y2005_Q3 -15.245 0.000 0.568 1.760 
Y2005_Q4 -13.502 0.000 0.590 1.695 
Y2006_Q1 -6.876 0.000 0.619 1.616 
Y2006_Q3 0.407 0.684 0.504 1.984 
Y2006_Q4 2.959 0.003 0.528 1.895 
Y2007_Q1 15.331 0.000 0.556 1.798 
Y2007_Q2 22.981 0.000 0.506 1.975 
Y2007_Q3 22.267 0.000 0.527 1.897 
Y2007_Q4 18.74 0.000 0.615 1.625 
D_330_HU -15.369 0.000 0.943 1.060 
D_660_HU -7.707 0.000 0.894 1.119 
D_990_HU -12.044 0.000 0.892 1.121 
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